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Abstract  
 
International health service research reveals a uniform tendency in practically all in-
dustrialised countries: an increasing shift of costs from solidarity-based financing to 
private households. Legislators and advisors usually justify this policy through the need 
to encourage cost-consciousness and especially “individual responsibility”. Economists 
consider cost-sharing in health care to be necessary to prevent abuse of the welfare 
state. They expect user charges and co-payments to motivate a more “rational” utilisa-
tion of health care and, thus, the financial stabilisation of health systems. 
Many politicians and economists base their assumptions about the “health market” 
on the theorem of demand-side moral hazard. This model transforms patients into ra-
tional “utility maximisers” consuming services beyond their needs thereby causing 
welfare losses to society as a whole. Moral hazard in health insurance belongs to the 
standard repertoires of economic textbooks. 
The present study analyses the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on pa-
tient cost-sharing published during the last forty years. The results show that persua-
sive evidence for demand-side moral hazard is still lacking. Furthermore, the claimed 
empiricism turns out to be inappropriate for providing evidence. Science health service 
research and clinical studies instead suggest that health insurance beneficiaries are not 
aiming to abuse the health system. In fact, introducing patient cost-sharing seems to 
endanger proper health care since it deters the sick from claiming benefits. The idea of 
“rational” use transpires to be out of touch with reality. 
After a systematic in-depth review of current research on the topic, the author con-
cludes that moral hazard in health insurance is a bogey of academic economic theory. 
Adequate reality-based evidence for implementing patient user fees and co-payments is 
lacking. In view of the detrimental effects on health service utilisation, he advises can-
celling existing co-payment arrangements and abandoning cost-sharing policies. 
  
Zusammenfassung 
 
Die internationale Gesundheitssystemforschung zeigt in praktisch allen Industrielän-
dern einen einheitlichen Trend auf: die zunehmende Verlagerung der Kosten von der 
solidarischen Finanzierung auf die privaten Haushalte. Gesetzgeber wie Berater begrün-
den dies üblicherweise mit der Stärkung von Kostenbewusstsein und vor allem der „Ei-
genverantwortung“. Wirtschaftswissenschaftler betrachten Selbstbeteiligungen in der 
Gesundheitsversorgung als notwendig, um dem Missbrauch der Solidargemeinschaft 
entgegenzuwirken. Von Gebühren und Zuzahlungen erwarten sie eine „vernünftigere“ 
Inanspruchnahme der Gesundheitsleistungen und eine finanzielle Stabilisierung der 
Systeme. 
Die Sicht vieler Politiker und Wirtschaftsexperten auf den „Gesundheitsmarkt“ ist 
durch das Theorem des versichertenseitigen Moral Hazard geprägt. Dieses Modell macht 
Krankenversicherte zu rationalen „Nutzenmaximierern“, die zum eigenen Vorteil über 
den Bedarf hinaus Leistungen in Anspruch nähmen und dadurch gesamtgesellschaftli-
che Wohlfahrtsverluste verursachten. Moral Hazard in der Krankenversicherung gehört 
zum Standard-Repertoire ökonomischer Lehrbücher. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit wertet die umfangreiche Literatur über Ansätze und Versu-
che der Kostenbeteiligung von Patienten aus, die in den letzten vier Jahrzehnten er-
schienen ist. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass belastbare Belege für das Moral-Hazard-
Verhalten von Versicherten bzw. Patienten bisher fehlen und die üblicherweise ange-
führte Empirie für den Nachweis ungeeignet ist. Gesundheitswissenschaftliche, versor-
gungsbezogene und klinische Studien legen vielmehr nahe, dass die Versicherten das 
System nicht ausnutzen wollen oder können. Die Einführung von Kostenbeteiligungen 
für Patienten scheint eher die bedarfsgerechte Versorgung zu gefährden, weil sie Kran-
ke von der Inanspruchnahme abhalten. Die Vorstellung von der „rationalen“ Nutzung 
des Gesundheitswesens entpuppt sich als realitätsfremd. 
Nach gründlicher Auswertung des Forschungsstandes kommt der Autor zum 
Schluss, dass Moral Hazard in der Krankenversicherung ein Popanz der akademischen 
Wirtschaftstheorie geblieben ist. Für die Einführung von Kostenbeteiligungen für Pati-
enten fehlt es an hinreichender realitätsbasierter Evidenz. In Anbetracht der schädli-
chen versorgungspolitischen Effekte erscheinen die Rücknahme aller Patientenzuzah-
lungen und der Verzicht auf Selbstbeteiligungen geboten. 
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Foreword 
 
Almost all healthcare systems include some form of cost-sharing arrangement for patients 
receiving medical treatment, and these are indeed one of the universal ways of financing 
healthcare. In the early phase of formally regulated social security systems the declared pur-
pose of cost-sharing was to provide an additional source of funding to contain the cost to in-
surers. By the 1960s, however, policymakers had begun advancing more sophisticated argu-
ments based in economic theory to justify patient co-payments. Above and beyond the goal of 
providing additional revenues for increasingly hard-pressed healthcare systems, co-
payments became part of a strongly advocated move to demand-side disincentives counter-
acting “moral hazard” and the “abuse” of services.  
At first glance this apparently simple and logical approach seems convincing. After all, 
empirical research repeatedly reveals an inverse relationship between the volume of co-
payments and the demand for healthcare. The various forms of co-payment have therefore 
generally come to be regarded as an effective means both to generate additional revenues and 
to reduce expenditure by encouraging “more sensible” use of the healthcare system. Although 
the theoretical concepts underlying this approach are largely ideologically driven and their 
empirical basis rather thin, the worldwide trend towards individualisation, marketisation and 
“greater individual responsibility” has boosted the use of patient co-payments as a prominent 
element of health reforms. 
In recent years sociologists and health researchers have taken an increasingly critical 
view both of the theory behind co-payments and of the empirical evidence supporting them. 
One of the main reasons to question the generally assumed positive effect of the co-payment 
system is the growing discrepancy between the potential offered by advances in medicine 
and pharmacology and the actual impact of these advances on the lives of the chronically ill. 
It is becoming increasing apparent that co-payments in fact have a negative effect on compli-
ance (adherence) to therapy, because they discourage particularly the poorer among the 
chronically ill from following their recommended treatment. 
Criticism of the rather simplistic assumption that every healthcare procedure that can be 
avoided leads to lower expenditure is certainly not new. The most relevant arguments against 
the use of co-payments are found in literature dating back to the 1960s. Both the obvious 
problem of social justice and the continuing lack of any proof that co-payments reduce 
healthcare expenditure effectively or reliably have since then thrown up more and more 
questions about the expected – or claimed – positive outcomes. 
This discussion paper is the result of an extensive study of the literature conducted be-
tween 2005 and 2007 for the Public Health Research Group at the Social Science Research 
Center Berlin (WZB) and initially appeared in German only (DP SP I 2008-305). After research-
ers at the Social Policy Centre (ZeS) at the University of Bremen had themselves undertaken a 
critical examination of the theoretical coherence and empirical reality of “moral hazard”, co-
payments and related incentives (Braun et al. 2006), the ZeS supported our efforts to make the 
present text available to a broader international readership by financing the cost of an Eng-
lish translation. For practical reasons the original paper has been neither revised nor up-
dated. 
The vast majority of studies published in the meantime impressively confirm the find-
ings and conclusions presented here and in some cases provide further convincing empirical 
indications of the undesirable effects of co-payments. Recent international discussion of the 
issue has drawn particular attention to the negative effects of co-payments on adherence to 
therapy (Colombi et al. 2008, Choudhry et al. 2010, Maciejewski et al. 2010) and to findings 
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showing that decreasing the financial burden on patients produces both better adherence to 
therapy and cost savings (e.g. Chernew et al. 2008, Choudhry et al. 2007 and 2008, Doshi et al. 
2010). Particularly worthy of mention with respect to the German healthcare system is the 
contribution by Eva Münster and her colleagues (2010), which shows that households in debt 
reduce their use of the healthcare system to a detrimental extent. All in all research findings 
published since our study was conducted have added to the already large volume of empirical 
evidence of undesirable and harmful effects of co-payments for medical treatment. Negative 
confirmation is supplied by certain economic approaches that seek to preserve the desirable 
steering effects of co-payments while suspending the undesirable selection effects (e.g. Götze 
and Salomon 2009), but have failed to provide any proof of effectiveness or practicability. 
Generally speaking, studies conducted since 2007 emphatically underline the empirical find-
ings collected in this working paper. 
 
Bernard Braun     Rolf Rosenbrock 
Social Policy Centre    Public Health Research Group 
University of Bremen    Social Science Research Center Berlin 
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Vorwort 
 
Zuzahlungen im Krankheitsfall sind praktisch ausnahmslos in allen Gesundheitssyste-
men anzutreffen und gehören zu den universell auftretenden Formen der Gesundheits-
finanzierung. In der Frühphase formaler sozialer Sicherungssysteme verfolgten Selbst-
beteiligungen erklärtermaßen das Ziel der Kostendämpfung durch die Gewinnung zu-
sätzlicher Mittel für die Krankenversorgung. Spätestens seit den 196oer Jahren kamen 
indes ausgeklügeltere wirtschaftstheoretische Begründungen für Patientenzuzahlungen 
auf. Über die Gewinnung zusätzlicher Einnahmen für die zunehmend klammen Gesund-
heitssysteme hinaus wurden Eigenbeteiligungen zu einem stark geförderten Ansatz zur 
Schaffung nachfrageseitiger Anreize mit dem Ziel, „moral hazard“ und dem „Miss-
brauch“ von Gesundheitsleistungen entgegenzuwirken. 
Auf den ersten Blick erscheint dieser Ansatz überzeugend einfach und nachvoll-
ziehbar. Empirische Ergebnisse offenbaren immer wieder eine umgekehrte Proportio-
nalität zwischen dem Umfang von Zuzahlungen und der Nachfrage nach Gesundheits-
leistungen. Die unterschiedlichen Formen von Selbstbeteiligungen in ihren unter-
schiedlichen Ausprägungen betrachtete man daher gemeinhin als wirksames Mittel 
sowohl zur Generierung zusätzlicher Einnahmen durch Reduzierung der Ausgaben als 
auch zur Erzeugung einer „vernünftigeren“ Inanspruchnahme von Gesundheitsleistun-
gen. Obwohl die zu Grunde liegenden theoretischen Konzepte eher ideologiegetrieben 
wirken und die empirischen Grundlagen weiterhin recht dünn erscheinen, förderten 
der weltweite Trend zu Individualisierung, „mehr Eigenverantwortung“ und Marktorien-
tierung wirksam die Anwendung von Patientenselbstbeteiligungen als prominentes 
Element von Gesundheitsreformen. 
In den letzten Jahren überprüfte die sozial- und gesundheitswissenschaftliche For-
schung zunehmend die Vorstellungen und die empirische Evidenz von Eigenbeteiligun-
gen kritisch. Anlass zum Hinterfragen der angenommenen positiven Zuzahlungswir-
kungen ist nicht zuletzt der wachsende Widerspruch zwischen dem potenziellen medi-
zinisch-pharmakologischen Fortschritt und dessen Wirksamkeit im richtigen Leben von 
chronisch kranken Menschen. Es stellte sich zunehmend heraus, dass Selbstbeteiligun-
gen im Krankheitsfall die compliance bzw. adherence to therapy negativ beeinflussen, 
denn Zuzahlungen halten vor allem ärmere Personen mit chronischen Erkrankungen 
davon ab, die empfohlenen Therapievorgaben einzuhalten. 
Die Kritik an der eher simplizistischen Annahme, jede vermiedene Gesundheitsleis-
tung führe zu geringeren Ausgaben ist aber keineswegs neu. Die relevantesten Argu-
mente gegen die Anwendung von Zuzahlungen finden sich seit den 1960er Jahren in 
der Literatur. Sowohl die offensichtlichen Problemen der sozialen Gerechtigkeit als 
auch das bisherige Ausbleiben des Nachweises, dass Selbstbeteiligungen wirksam und 
zuverlässig die Gesundheitsausgaben senken, haben seither immer mehr Fragen zu den 
erwarteten – bzw. unterstellten – positiven Ergebnissen von Zuzahlungen im Krank-
heitsfall aufgeworfen. 
Das vorliegende discussion paper ist das Ergebnis einer zwischen 2005 und 2007 
durchgeführten, umfangreichen Literaturstudie für die Forschungsgruppe Public Health 
im Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung Berlin (WZB) und ist zunächst auf 
deutsch erschienen (DP SP I 2008-305). Nachdem sich Wissenschaftler des Zentrums für 
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Sozialpolitik (ZeS) der Universität Bremen selber bereits kritisch mit der theoretischen 
Stimmigkeit und empirischen Wirklichkeit von „moral hazard“, Zuzahlungen und ähnli-
cher Anreize (Braun et al. 2006) auseinandergesetzt hatten, unterstützte das ZeS die Be-
mühungen, den vorliegenden Text auch einem breiteren internationalen Publikum zu-
gänglich zu machen und übernahm dankenswerterweise die Kosten für die Übertragung 
ins Englische. Aus praktischen Gesichtspunkten erfolgten weder Änderungen noch eine 
Aktualisierung des ursprünglichen Papers. 
Zwischenzeitlich publizierte wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen bestätigen ganz 
überwiegend und eindrücklich die hier dargestellten Befunde und Schlussfolgerungen 
oder liefern weitere überzeugende empirische Hinweise auf unerwünschte Wirkungen 
von Zuzahlungen. Besonderes Augenmerk legt die internationale Diskussion derzeit auf 
die negativen Einflüsse von Selbstbeteiligungen auf die adherence to therapy (Colombi et 
al. 2008, Choudhry et al. 2010, Maciejewski et al. 2010) und auf Befunde, nach denen 
eine verringerte Kostenbelastungen für PatientInnen sowohl zur Verbesserung der The-
rapietreue als auch zu Kostenersparnis führt (z.B. Chernew et al. 2008, Choudhry et al. 
2007 und 2008, Doshi et al 2010). In Bezug auf die deutsche Situation ist besonders der 
Beitrag von Eva Münster und KollegInnen (Münster et al. 2010) erwähnenswert, der bei 
verschuldeten Haushalten eine unvernünftige Reduzierung er Inanspruchnahme von 
Gesundheitsleistungen nachweist. Insgesamt haben zwischenzeitlich publizierte For-
schungsergebnisse den großen Berg empirischer Belege für unerwünschte und schädli-
che Wirkungen von Zuzahlungen im Krankheitsfall weiter vergrößert. Dies belegen 
letztlich auch einzelne wirtschaftstheoretische Ansätze, die erwünschte Steuerungswir-
kungen erhalten und unerwünschte Selektionseffekte abfedern möchten (z.B. Götze und 
Salomon 2009), allerdings den Nachweis der Wirksamkeit wie der Praktikabilität noch 
erbringen müssen. Insgesamt unterstreichen neuere, seit 2007 erschienene Studien 
nachdrücklich die in diesem Arbeitspapier gesammelten empirischen Befunde. 
 
Bernard Braun     Rolf Rosenbrock 
Zentrum für Sozialpolitik    Forschungsgruppe Public Health 
Universität Bremen    Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
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1 Introduction 
 
This study examines attempts to introduce pecuniary control of health service demand 
through direct payments by patients. Making patients contribute to the costs of their 
medical treatment is one of the oldest health policy ideas, almost as old as Germany’s 
socialised health insurance system itself. During the hyperinflation of 1923 the statu-
tory health insurance fund introduced a 10-percent co-payment for prescription medi-
cations.1 At the end of the 1920s the physician Gustav Hartz complained: “Don’t people 
go to the doctor a dozen times without a thought, when once would be enough – just 
because the fund is paying? … They go to the doctor for a cold or a minor injury where 
previously they would have been ashamed to call themselves sick and take the doctor’s 
time at all.”2 In line with this view, the next steps to increase cost-sharing came with 
Brüning’s emergency decrees of 1930/31, which introduced a voucher fee and increased 
prescription charges.3 
By the end of the 1950s Christian democratic politicians in West Germany – in par-
ticular Theodor Blank (labour minister 1957–65) – had put the issue of direct patient 
cost-sharing back on the agenda.4 Since then the question has played a central role in 
the Federal Republic’s social policy debate and health sector reforms. The Health Mod-
ernisation Act of 2004 introduced a “practice fee” (comparable with the voucher fee) and 
increased drug co-payments.5 Although the Statutory Health Insurance Competition 
Strengthening Act of 2006 refrained from further increasing cost-sharing, it did break 
another taboo by raising the idea of excluding “self-inflicted” conditions. A clause abol-
ishing coverage of “self-inflicted” illnesses (and thus further increasing out-of-pocket 
payments) was discussed, but not ultimately included.6 The declared goal of all the re-
forms, and especially of shifting costs to patients, is to slow the steady general increase 
in health care costs. 
The application of out-of-pocket payments for health care is closely tied to the con-
cept of “responsible” behaviour by free independent citizens acting as economic sub-
                                                  
1  Schulenburg 1984a: 253; Frerich/Frey 1996: 208. 
2  Hartz, Gustav (1928). Irrwege der deutschen Sozialpolitik und der Weg zur sozialen Freiheit. 
Berlin; quoted after Höhn 1996: 23. 
3  Deppe 1987: 94. 
4  Schulenburg 1984a: 254. 
5  The innovation implemented by the Health Modernisation Act (Gesundheitsmodernisierungs-
gesetz - GMG) of 2004 was to introduce 10 percent cost sharing for all health benefits up to a 
ceiling of €10 per service item or per hospital day for inpatient care (§ 61 SGB V). The so 
called “practice fee” derives from this general regulation and corresponds to the maximum 
co-payment of €10 per visit. 
6  The coalition working group on the Statutory Health Insurance Competition Strengthening 
Act (Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung - Wettbewerbsstärkungsgesetz - GKV-WSG) had seri-
ously discussed the exclusion of benefits due to “self-inflicted” health problems. However, 
this would have prompted a flood of lawsuits paralysing the Social Courts because the rela-
tionship between causes and effects with regard to accidents and diseases is often a chicken 
and egg dilemma. But the idea of reducing the financial burden from 2 to 1 percent of house-
hold income, if patients can prove regular utilisation of preventive diagnostic services, found 
its way into the first draft law (§ 62 SGB V); this approach follows the idea of rewarding peo-
ple’s “good conduct” with lower co-payments. 
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jects. Whereas cost-sharing in developing countries is supposed to encourage people to 
value medical care and demand better quality of the services they pay for, in the world’s 
rich countries the focus is much more on controlling the behaviour of the “consumer in 
the health market”. 
Across the world, social policy reforms pursue greater efficiency and fairness. In 
the European welfare states, and in many other countries too, these two goals are ex-
plicitly linked. This raises the question whether and to what extent out-of-pocket pay-
ments increase the efficiency and/or enhance the fairness of a health service.7 
To answer these important academic and policy questions, the present study exam-
ines the following questions: 
• Does direct patient cost-sharing improve the efficiency of use of resources 
in health care? 
• What effects does it have on social inequality of health opportunities in the 
population, and the political goal of reducing this?8 
• What do the existing studies on this subject have to say, and how relevant 
are they to the realities of healthcare? 
• What conclusions can be drawn concerning the commonplace ideas of health 
economics? 
 
Many of this overview study’s significant findings contradict the accepted ideas of 
health economics and call into question widespread assumptions. Many social policy 
recommendations and decisions are based much more on subjective perceptions than 
on hard evidence. So in the interests of evidence-based health policy it would appear a 
matter of urgency to collect precise information about the complex and often underes-
timated social repercussions of direct cost-sharing. 
 
                                                  
7  Efficiency means the economical utilisation of available resources and refers in principle to 
achieving a given objective with minimal effort. However, the social and health policy debate 
is dominated by a micro-economic approach where efficiency is used with a more restricted 
meaning, due to the combination of scarce goods with needs alleged to be infinite. The neo-
classical efficiency concept assumes rationally acting individuals willing to maximise their 
utility in a market of perfect competition. In any case, the currently predominant concept of 
economic efficiency, so-called allocative efficiency, differs essentially from the intuitive, 
generally accepted meaning of the word and especially from the clinical understanding of 
what is supposed to be efficient (cf. Schlander 2005: 38). 
Economically determined “efficiency” has become an unquestioned catchword, perceived as a 
good and effective criterion per se but about as meaningless as the comparable terms “mod-
ern” and “up to date”. Particularly with the current concept of efficiency, there is a high risk 
of abusive application because it largely fails to take into account ecological factors and an 
array of social aspects which are not so easily reflected in formulaic and mathematical terms. 
But when distributional equity and social justice are taken into account, the omnipresent 
claim of “greater efficiency” can easily become an oxymoron, as the health economist Uwe 
Reinhardt (1989: 340f) wryly points out. 
8  Cf. Ottawa-Charter - WHO 2004b 
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2 The Neo-classical Reinterpretation of Healthcare 
Private health spending by European Union citizens has increased steadily over the past 
twenty-five years, largely on account of increasing co-payments.9 Although patient 
cost-sharing is nothing new in the western European welfare state tradition, its extent 
has increased conspicuously in recent years. This general tendency not only begs the 
question why legislators in various countries have increasingly resorted to out-of-
pocket payment for health care. It is also necessary to examine the legitimising models 
on which this systemic trend is based. 
Driving the restructuring of health services is an increased focus on the financial 
side, and on international and national competitiveness, stemming not only from glob-
alisation, but also from society’s prioritisation of profit and return on capital. This has 
been closely connected to the idea that the patient must conform to the homo 
oeconomicus model, the “new man” created by neo-classical economics, which could be 
said to be the most successful ideological model of man ever created. In Christian com-
munities the frail and the sick were still regarded shown charity in keeping with the 
precept of “love thy neighbour”. In medieval guilds and working mens’ associations col-
leagues and workmates insured one another against incapacity and old age; these were 
the precursors of the statutory health insurance system in Germany and other Euro-
pean countries. After the Industrial Revolution welfare states acquired health insurance 
bodies that brought together the population in more or less fragmented “caring com-
munities”. The system was set up initially to compensate for income lost through ill-
ness, and only later took on the funding of medical treatment. Both in the Bismarck-
style social insurance systems and in the national health services created after the Sec-
ond World War, patients always remained part of a community that shared social risks 
through a sense of solidarity. 
Ideas about the place of the patient and perceptions of health care have changed 
fundamentally over the past two decades. Today the health policy debate – like the 
health economics literature – is dominated largely by fundamental tenets from the 
world of economics and by business priorities: 
• Health is no longer a public good distinguished from other goods by a series 
of special features. As neo-liberal concepts and ideas spread there was a 
fundamental reassessment of social values and structures. In the course of 
this, health not only lost its character as a human and social right, but also 
increasingly gained the status of a commodity that is subject to market 
mechanisms just like any other. If the character of a public good and the so-
cial implications of health are ignored, one can even find good arguments 
for cost-sharing in the service of redistribution (and even ultimately of 
fairness): “… with health being a normal good, having positive income and 
negative price elasticities, those in the upper half of the income distribution 
consume much more than the poor.”10 
                                                  
9    Jemiai et al. 2004: 1; Council of the European Union 2007: 7. 
10  Baker/van der Gaag 1993: 393. 
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• Conventional economic theories generally assume that the almost insatiable 
demand of citizens or fund members for (para-)medical services is largely 
responsible for the steady growth in health spending (alongside general cost 
increases for health services).11 The primary thrust of this line of thought, 
which also stresses the general scarcity of resources and potential problems 
of unfairness associated with otherwise supposedly unavoidable rationing, 
is to deter the “consumer” from making use of unnecessary and superfluous 
treatments,12 but beyond that also to stem supplier-induced expansion of 
services,13 and avoid having the health insurance funds pay for “useless” 
services.14 Out-of-pocket payments promise to be effective in reducing take-
up when the marginal opportunity costs of the service exceed the subjective 
marginal utility of treatment.15 Because price increases usually lead to re-
duced consumption (even of important goods), user charges appear to be the 
generally recognised solution to the supposed “cost explosion”. And because 
overuse of health services is paraded as the central problem of modern so-
cial systems, co-payments enjoy broad acceptance as a suitable measure in 
the struggle against “rampant” health spending.16 
 
Redefining health services as consumer goods and patients as rational consumers opens 
the way to apply regulatory goals and instruments from the consumer goods markets to 
the field of health care. As the central yardstick for the health service we now find an 
inflated and very arbitrary concept of “efficiency”, which at the societal level leads to a 
market-driven reformulation of political goals. Cost containment at the macro-level and 
control of health service use at the micro-level become the central concerns.17 It is es-
pecially conspicuous that efforts to control spending are directed largely at consumers 
and rarely or never towards providers. Despite the availability of many effective ap-
proaches acting primarily on the supply side – limiting the number of services or ser-
vice-providers (e.g. by restricting the number of practices or introducing positive drug 
lists), budgeting or price regulation, more effective control of the pharmaceuticals in-
dustry and medical equipment manufacturers, deeper structural reforms (GP system, 
managed care, etc.) and explicit rationing – direct patient cost-sharing is widely re-
garded as the most important tool for reducing spending in the health service.18 
                                                  
11  Shapiro 2003; Henke/Schreyögg 2004: 64. 
12  Criel 1998a: 28. 
13  Kraft/Schulenburg 1985: 137. 
14  Schulenburg 1984b: 1280. 
15  Dixon et al. 2002a: 6. 
16  Newhouse et al. 1981: 1504f; Schulenburg 1984a: 258; Shapiro 2003; cf. Barer et al. 1998: 21. 
17  Carrin/Hanvoravongchai 2003: 2, 6; Prada et al. 2004: 38; Jemiai et al. 2004: 2; Zu-
vekas/Cohen 2007: 256. 
18  Cf. Schulenburg 1984a-d and 2007: 14f; Schulenburg/ Frommknecht 1984; 
Kraft/Schulenburg 1985; Schulenburg/Wieland 1987: 126f; Henke/Schreyögg 2004: 22. 
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3 Patients as Consumers 
If economic thinking and principles are to be applied meaningfully to the health care 
system, the underlying theory must be sound, or at least able to explain reality in a 
convincing manner. However, health economics touches on a series of mostly implicit 
assumptions that run through the debate as quasi-axioms but are much too rarely 
tested against other theories, and above all practice. When modelling the “new” patient, 
economists also resort – generally pretty simplistically – to assumptions from the text-
books of supply and demand theory:19 
 
1. Consumers have sufficient information to make good choices. 
2. Individuals are rational. 
3. Consumers know with certainty the results of their decisions. 
4. Individuals reveal their preferences through their actions. 
5. A person is the best judge of his or her welfare. 
6. Social welfare is based solely on individual utility, which in turn is based 
solely on the goods and services consumed. 
Abstract concepts of the market assume that all actors possess sufficient information to 
make a rational decision to the benefit of all involved. Here the individual consumer is 
treated as the sole expert when it comes to his or her own behaviour as a consumer. 
One of the forefathers of modern free-market economic theory, Friedrich August von 
Hayek, formulated the underlying idea as follows: “It is with respect to this that practi-
cally every individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique 
information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only 
if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his active coopera-
tion.”20 The astonishing thing about this quote is how vague the statements are. Hayek’s 
supporters seem not to have realised that they are designed to evade the possibility of 
direct contradiction. What is meant by “practically every individual” and who are the 
exceptions? The formulation “some advantage” implies possibly some absolutely deci-
sive restriction, and the scope of the individual’s “active cooperation” remains ex-
tremely vague and open to interpretation (in the sense of much broader restrictions of 
consumer freedom of choice than the market radicals are talking about). 
US economist Thomas Rice wonders about his colleagues: “in a world such as ours, 
where high-paid consultants abound and access to more information seems to be the 
key to success, it is noteworthy that economists often consider an individual consumer 
to be the world’s greatest expert in one particular area. This area, of course, is what he 
or she wants.”21 But just a glance at real economic life raises great doubts about the sig-
nificance of sufficient information for consumer decision-making. At the very least, the 
                                                  
19  Compilation according to Rice 1998: 5. 
20  Hayek 1954: 522. 
21  Rice 1998: 65. 
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huge importance of advertising for consumer behaviour must cast great doubt on the 
idea of the informed customer decision. And – to cite just one example familiar to every 
citizen – how can this theory hold up in the incomprehensible complexity of today’s 
telecommunications market?22 
Finally, in the “health market” the idea of free consumer choice comes apart com-
pletely.23 The information asymmetry between medical expert and patient (who one can 
define in reference to the word’s roots as the “suffering layman”) is self-evident, suffi-
ciently discussed, and unavoidable (unless and until the whole population is able to en-
joy medical training). Furthermore, the process of economisation of the health care sys-
tem has increased the relevance of information asymmetries between funders (e.g. in-
surance funds, health ministry) and service-providers (physicians, hospitals, other 
therapists) and the inequality of knowledge between insurers and their members.24 In 
the latter field there are comprehensive analyses of information advantages of fund 
members resulting for example in adverse selection or moral hazard,25 but relatively 
few studies of the effects of an information advantage of insurers over their customers 
or also over the service-providers they contract and pay. 
Various studies of consumer behaviour in the health market also raise fundamental 
questions regarding patient autonomy as assumed or wished for in free-market ideol-
ogy. A certain proportion of fund members and patients regularly contradict the as-
sumptions about individual responsibility, preferring to leave decisions about diagnosis 
and treatment to the doctors.26 This tendency is stronger in tumour patients than 
among healthy citizens, and is largely found among older people, with more than half of 
the over-70s (54 percent) expressing this view.27 Although female, younger, healthier 
                                                  
22  Behavioural patterns in health care and in the case of illness were often more adequately 
described in the spirit of the Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper: “The actors always 
act in a way that is most adequate to the situation which they find themselves in” (see Pütz 
2003: 28, footnote 23). Finally it is easily comprehensible that a given acute situation can 
determine and shift people’s priority-setting, sometimes in very short order. Popper’s 
statement, however, gets to the core of the matter only in a slightly modified way: people 
always act in a way that seems to be the most adequate to the situation in which they find 
themselves. Especially with regard to health services, external effects and ignorance of the 
individual consequences of treatment alternatives or non-treatment accumulate in an addi-
tive way. 
23  Hibbard/Weeks 1988: 234. 
24  Cf. on this point Hibbard/Weeks 1988: 236. 
25  Cf. Hoffman 2003: 669; Wagstaff/Pradhan 2005: 1. 
26  Deber et al. 2000: 1417ff. 
27  Steinbach et al. 2004: 2f. In addition, attention should be paid to the fact that in various 
studies a certain share of health-care-seeking individuals tend to disprove the individual-
utilitarian theory by preferring to hand over therapeutic decisions to medical professionals 
(Deber et al. 2000: 1417ff). This behaviour is more pronounced in tumour patients than in 
healthy people and can be observed mainly in the elderly (54 percent among those over 70 
years) (Steinbach et al. 2004: 2f). Obviously the diagnosis of “cancer” has a polarising effect 
and an impact on behaviour that confirms Karl Popper’s assumption. Certainly there are ad-
ditional factors in place that are independent of the patient, and the consideration of which 
would require a significant broadening of prevalent economic theoretical approaches. That 
means there is obviously an inverse correlation between patients’ trust in their attending 
physicians and the desire for autonomy with regard to treatment decisions: the lower the 
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and better-educated patients tend to want to have a say and make their own decisions 
more than their male, older, sicker and less educated counterparts,28 there are minori-
ties with opposing expectations on both sides of this rough divide.29 Just as it skims 
over the issue of information asymmetry (elsewhere heavily criticised as market-
distorting), health economics also all too often ignores the complexity of rational cus-
tomer decision-making when analysing the health sector. It also owes an answer to the 
problem that specific expert knowledge can often stand in contradiction to subjectively 
prioritised personal health needs.30 This is confirmed, too, by the observation that 
plainly the mere circumstance of “being a patient” negatively influences people’s confi-
dence to make decisions, and that they need not only expert advice but also encourage-
ment to take responsibility.31 
Effective control of demand for medical services through patient cost-sharing pre-
supposes individuals who are in a position to make the right decision for their health 
after taking into account the given financial incentives.32 There is no doubt that prop-
erly informed “consumers” in the health market (otherwise known as patients) would 
be an absolutely desirable institution – not just for economists but for physicians too. 
But they belong more to the realm of myth than to social reality. Of course medical lay-
people can decide on the basis of their momentary condition whether or not they are 
willing to come up with a particular sum for medical treatment, but this is based only 
on belief, hope or intuition, not on information.33 
If we go beyond the level of cost-sharing for regulating access to treatment and ex-
amine the control effects on take-up of medical services, Hayek’s formulation of the 
individual’s “active cooperation” becomes especially relevant. In view of the enormous 
information asymmetry between physician and patient, “practically every individual” 
should be able to derive “some advantage” from involving experts with appropriate 
knowledge in their own decision-making before making a (secondary) informed con-
sumer decision. However this certainly realistic situation depends on another very dif-
ferent assumption, which has to do directly with the information required for a correct 
consumer decision. This assumption is that there are always clear rational criteria that 
allow a firm distinction to be made between indicated “sensible” and non-indicated “su-
perfluous” treatments. But this is simply not the case in medical reality. Medical treat-
ments to which there is no alternative tend to be the exception, and even that only be-
comes clear – if at all – after a minimum number of examinations have been carried 
                                                                                                                                                  
patients’ trust in medical professionals, the more they want to assume decision-making re-
sponsibility, while people with moderate or higher confidence in their physician prefer 
shared decision-making (Entwistle 2004: 271). 
28  Levinson et al. 2005: 532f; Garfield et al. 2007: 365f. 
29  McKintry 2000: 868ff. 
30  In view of the massive intrusion of “economic experts” and economic theoreticians in the 
social policy debate, one might be tempted to recommend the citizens of a good many coun-
tries to consider another pearl of wisdom from Karl Popper: “The most important thing is to 
mistrust all those great prophets who have a nostrum in their pockets and tell you: if you 
just give me full power, then I will guide you to heaven” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27.7.2002: III; 
translation by the author)). 
31  Stiggelbout/Kiebert 1997: 388f. 
32  Hibbard/Weeks 1988: 236, 245. 
33  Cf. e.g. Steffen et al. 2007, Bachmann et al. 2007 and Grudzen/Brook 2007: 1127. 
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out. So information relevant to decision-making can generally only arise when it is no 
longer of any use for financially motivated decision-making. 
The second fundamental implicit assumption on which health service cost-sharing 
is based is that people’s actions are fundamentally and in all situations rational or ra-
tionally guided; that under particular given circumstances consumers will make deci-
sions based on “rational” utility criteria (i.e. comprehensible in terms of their subjective 
logic and preferences). This thesis also reflects an understanding of human thinking 
that is very individualistically constructed and above all reduced to a given moment, 
according to which individuals exist in an imaginary space without any social or his-
torical context and make absolutely uninfluenced decisions. 
Ultimately the theory of the economically rational individual cannot be disproved, 
because within the specified logic countless reasons and justifications can be found that 
allow particular behaviour to appear “rational” as long as one ignores or marginalises 
all the factors that suggest extreme irrationality. The carelessness with which the sup-
porters of belief in rationality treat their own theory is demonstrated not least by stud-
ies of the “rationality” of addicts in dealing with their addiction.34 Nobody can deny that 
a forty-year-old with a perforated peptic ulcer is following his own rationality if he, for 
example, rejects any medical treatment on the grounds of his phobia of white coats. But 
such a theory contradicts not only many findings of other social sciences, but also 
common sense and the biological instinct for self-preservation. Unlike other academic 
disciplines, which generally start from the question of how people actually behave un-
der particular circumstances, economists tend to pursue the question of how people 
should behave in order to maximise individual gain or social wellbeing.35 
Another fundamental assumption behind free-market incentives and management 
in the health market is that patients are always able to overview and assess the conse-
quences of their respective demand decision with sufficient confidence. That would 
mean that even in phases of subjective suffering, every person would be able to prop-
erly assess the consequences of accepting or refusing medical treatment. In other 
words, every patient decides whether or not to “consume” a treatment on the basis of a 
reliable assessment of the consequences. 
As well as raising doubts about the practical relevance of this assumption in real 
life, just taking a glance at “normal” markets also indicates a serious shortcoming in the 
theory on which it is based. Who has not had the experience that a purchase decision – 
for example new software or the introduction of a new technology – inevitably ended in 
the purchase of a complete new computer system, of which there was not the slightest 
indication at the beginning? And when buying a car, who can really estimate the risk of 
causing an accident leading to life-long indebtedness or a prison sentence and ensuing 
loss of income? These few examples suffice to show how short-sighted, unimaginative 
and limited the understanding of “awareness” is in connection with the consequences of 
consumer decisions. 
Departing from the exclusively individual utilitarian level, the theory that people 
are fully aware of the consequences of consumer decisions turns out to be completely 
divorced from reality. Current political debates lead to branches of the economy where 
there is every reason to doubt that consumers include external effects to any relevant 
                                                  
34  Cf. Rice 2004: 114f. 
35  Rice 1997: 393. 
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extent in their purchasing decisions. For example no-one can seriously claim that a car 
buyer choosing a louder or less fuel-economical model will also consider the number of 
additional heart attacks,36 or respiratory illnesses,37 it causes or the resulting loss of life 
expectancy of those affected.38 And the proportion of tourists who are dissuaded from 
flying for ecological reasons – or at least buy carbon offsets – is so small that in this 
field too there is next to no empirical evidence of an adequate inclusion of essential 
(external) criteria in purchasing decisions. For lack of reliable data anyone attempting 
to operationalise the “sagacity” of consumers is forced to work with largely fictitious 
constants and accept correspondingly unrealistic results. Failure to even include the 
aforementioned and other consequences in the ideas and theories runs the automaticc 
risk of simply overlooking fundamental differences between theoretical hypotheses and 
real existing (economic) life.39 
An intrinsic characteristic of the health sector is that the “consumers” themselves 
have inadequate knowledge even about supposedly known illnesses.40 Consequently 
laypeople are generally unable to assess the consequences of accepting or rejecting 
medical treatment; indeed experts do not always succeed in doing this, and generally 
only following particular tests. To some extent this is in the nature of things, for the 
human organism has a great capacity for adaptation and self-healing. Not to put too fine 
a point on it, even in our “modern” medical system it is often unclear whether a healing 
success was achieved because of or despite a particular therapy. It is similarly unclear 
to a layperson whether a deterioration was inevitable or caused by a lack of treatment. 
Although compliance or adherence to recommended therapies represents a complex 
problem, it also touches without doubt on the level of awareness behind health-related 
consumer decisions.41 The broad range of experience with existing compliance prob-
lems and their consequences does nothing to support the idea of making informed deci-
sions about using medical treatment.42 
So if consumers do not know what they are getting, do they at least know what they 
want? For economists the answer appears simple. Economic models generally assume 
that people know their personal preferences and choose consciously from the range on 
offer.43 There is also an assumption that the wish to acquire more applies only up to a 
certain quantity of consumed goods or services, and that the additional benefit per unit 
decreases after a certain point (decreasing marginal utility). The decision how much to 
consume also depends on the price, which appears to increase in relative terms as mar-
ginal utility decreases – as it also does of course where available income is less. 
In consumer theory, under the premise that marginal utility will decrease after a 
certain level has been reached, we have to conclude that people will make their con-
sumer decisions so as to maximise utility according to their personal preferences and 
market prices. If the expected equilibrium between consumer behaviour and demand 
                                                  
36  Hoffmann et al. 2007. 
37  Chauhan et al. 2005; Holgate 2005; Laurent et al. 2007. 
38  M. Finkelstein et al. 2003; Schreyer et al. 2007 
39  Cf. Reinhardt 2001: 978f. 
40  Bachmann et al 2007. 
41  Cf. Silverman 2004: 26. 
42  Petermann 2004, Holst 2007. 
43  Cf. Rice 2004: 117f. 
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has been achieved after enjoyment of the acquired goods and services, people cease 
their market-related activities.44 According to this theory patient cost-sharing and es-
pecially its “optimal level” depend decisively on individual risk of sickness and above all 
on patients’ preferences, which differ from person to person.45 
In practice it is almost impossible to measure consumer preferences empirically 
and forecast purchasing decisions. Ultimately, market researchers always need a fin-
ished product and a group of test purchasers to simulate the market. In order to over-
come this dilemma economists use announced preferences, which measure demand for 
preferred consumer goods exclusively in terms of actual past purchasing behaviour to 
the complete exclusion of human psychology and other factors.46 Using the theoretical 
assumption that consumers select their particular preferred basket of goods in the ser-
vice of maximising their own utility, researchers derive individuals’ preferences from 
observed consumer decisions made under particular price and income conditions. The 
question whether it is permissible at all to draw retrospective conclusions about con-
sumers’ preferences on the basis of purchases made in the past (given that purchasing 
decisions are subject to a wide range of influencing factors and are made individually 
and situatively in the moment of the consumer decision) is simply not addressed at all. 
The fundamental assumption for all forms of demand-led management – that every 
consumer is interested first and foremost in maximising individual utility understood 
in pecuniary terms – turns out on closer examination to be simply intrinsic to the the-
ory and all conclusions derived from it are nothing but self-fulfilling prophecies. Only 
as long as it is assumed that utility maximisation under particular conditions is the sole 
or at least primary motivation for consumer behaviour can preferences be derived from 
past consumer decisions. But if we admit other factors such as taste, inclination, emo-
tion and altruism as motives for particular purchasing behaviour, and acknowledge the 
extensive findings of other disciplines, we find that purchasing behaviour does not (ex-
clusively) express announced preferences and we come to the logical opposite conclu-
sion that individual utility maximisation is actually not the decisive driving force. Only 
if we make every consumer – albeit retroactively – into a utility maximiser is the homo 
oeconomicus model coherent and ultimately impossible to disprove. 
Economics thus creates a theoretical system that allows human behaviour to be 
considered in complete isolation from the action that would be expected or recom-
mended in relation to the situation. Worse still, it analyses human behaviour through 
mono-dimensional interpretation of an isolated outcome and makes no effort even to 
consider the complexity of human nature starting at the intra-individual level. Eco-
nomic consumer theory ignores the fact that human activity is not always exclusively 
motivated by egotism and self-centred utility maximisation, but that other factors such 
as status, group membership and identity, taste, commitment, sympathy and other psy-
cho-emotional motives are significant.47 It excludes any social dimension of human 
existence, where there is unavoidable interaction between the utility functions of dif-
ferent market participants or consumers.48 If people’s consumer decisions are led not 
                                                  
44  Cf. Rice 2004: 36, 92. 
45  Cf. Breyer et al. 2005: 267. 
46  Sugden 1993: 1949. 
47. Cf. Sen 1982: 92ff; Rice 1997: 389f. 
48  Sen 1982: 99; Rice 2004: 119f. 
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exclusively by their own, but also by others’ motives, consumer behaviour will only 
partially reflect personal preferences. 
Radical free-marketeers regard social wellbeing as the mere sum of individual util-
ity maximisation, which in turn can only result from consumption of goods and ser-
vices. They are always trying to show that welfare state institutions such as social 
health insurance or tax-funded health services lead to a “welfare loss” because the un-
avoidable occurrence of moral hazard leads people with such security to express exces-
sive demand for health services49 that are not “actually” medically necessary.50 Empiri-
cal studies have indeed shown changes in use of medical treatment when the costs in-
volved are to be covered from the patient’s own pocket, and this has been interpreted as 
an expression of “cost awareness”.51 It is not surprising that this idea is especially wide-
spread among economists,52 but it is also found among physicians, politicians and other 
professions. 
The question of what exactly “medically unnecessary” means and what criteria 
should be applied to determine the necessity of treatment remains completely unan-
swered – and often unasked. There is also no sensible suggestion as to who can and 
should make such a decision at all, when it is to be made and how the inevitable uncer-
tainties should be dealt with. It is in the nature of healthcare that the necessity of de-
mand can only be judged retrospectively.53 Despite the term’s imprecision and impracti-
cality, the concept of the “actual” necessity of medical treatment serves as an argument 
against comprehensive welfare coverage, especially among the fraternity of econo-
mists.54 In view of the conceptual arbitrariness and the complete separation from clini-
cal criteria it is obvious that this must be largely a matter of belief and subjective per-
ception. But above all such concepts and theories not only operate under the usual as-
sumption that human behaviour fully obeys the homo oeconomicus model, they also 
follow the idea that illness is an equally distributed random event.55 However, even in 
the discussion of social protection and welfare effects economic researchers come to 
diametrically opposing conclusions. Whereas some authors believe they can calculate a 
                                                  
49  Pauly 1968: 535; Feldstein 1973: 252ff, 275ff. 
50  Henke et al. 2002: 12. 
51  Feldstein 1973: 268, 270f, 274. 
52  Cf. Feldman/Morrisey 1990. 
53  Incidentally, this holds true not only for the moral hazard issue of excessive “frivolous” 
utilisation of health care in case of minor health problems or “self-inflicted” illness; equally, 
in a situation of sudden unconsciousness, a relevant and generally accepted indication for 
emergency care, it is only after completing the resuscitation efforts that it is possible to 
validate whether they were meaningful or needless. This case, which is certainly extreme 
but not at all rare and by all means cost relevant, makes explicitly clear the absurdity of 
constructs such as “necessary” or “frivolous” health benefits. 
54  Pauly 1968: 534f. 
55  So Mark Pauly (1968: 531) states clearly: “It is assumed that all individuals are expected util-
ity maximizers and are risk-averters, and that the incidence of illness is a random event.” 
Likewise, Breyer and Haufler (2000, p. 450) base their argumentation on the assumption that 
health risks were equally distributed: “Importantly, we assume that all individuals face the 
same probability of being sick”. This approach banishes from consideration a series of rele-
vant criteria such as social determinants of illness, environmental factors and others. 
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“welfare loss” through comprehensive health cover,56 others restrict themselves to es-
timates.57 Others still conclude that general coverage of the whole population for finan-
cial risks of illness could certainly have a welfare-enhancing effect.58 
 
4 The Model Platonism of Actuarial Mathematics 
The introduction of patient cost-sharing in countries with existing social security sys-
tems generally follows the goal of counteracting the phenomenon of insurance-based 
moral hazard.59 Until recently most empirical health insurance research was dedicated 
to this question,60 and here the econometric literature offers an absolutely boundless 
wealth of models, sophisticated formulae and other apparently objective predictors of 
consumer behaviour.61 A central role in these theories is played by price elasticity, even 
if this seems to play out very differently for different medical treatments,62 social 
strata, age groups63 and degrees of severity of illness.64 65 Here the patient as a rational 
consumer reappears, taking into account the costs involved in his “purchasing deci-
sion”.66 But the pure cost of medical treatment is always also accompanied by additional 
opportunity costs for travel, accommodation, food and income loss that are sometimes 
quite considerable for the patient and (especially but not exclusively in developing 
countries) can represent many times the actual health spending and thus can make a 
mockery of any discussion of price elasticity and its effects on demand.67 
Of course basing the theory on price elasticity and calculating “optimal” co-payments 
raises the suspicion that this could be a self-fulfilling prophecy, because the underlying 
                                                  
56  Feldstein 1973; q.v. Schulenburg 1984d: 15; Han 2007. 
57  Feldman/Dowd 1991: 299f.; Manning/Marquis 1996: 627ff. 
58  Nyman 1999a: 145ff; Nyman 1999b: 819f; Nyman 2004: 196f; Nyman 2006: 20, 22f. 
59  The debate on direct cost sharing for health care is mostly dominated by the ex-post moral 
hazard assumption, i.e. the presumed unlimited utilisation and production of health care 
services when payment relies on a third party; in contrast, ex-ante moral hazard is of rather 
more theoretical relevance when it comes to concluding a (health insurance) contract (cf. 
Drèze 2001: 1f). 
60  Wagstaff/Pradhan 2005: 1. 
61  Arrow 1963: 969ff; Zeckhauser 1970: 12ff; Feldstein 1973: 267ff; Schulenburg 1987, 157ff; 
Dow et al. 2000: 6ff; Geoffard 2000: 126ff; Breyer/Haufler 2000: 450ff; Cutler 2001: 38ff; 
Drèze 2001; Remler/Atherly 2003: 271f; Parente et al. 2004; Osterkamp 2003a: 8ff; Nyman 
2003: 4ff; French/Jones 2004: 707f; Hoel 2004; Winkelmann 2004: 1084f; Breyer et al. 2005: 
244ff; Shang 2005: 17ff; Smith 2005: 1020ff; Atella et al. 2006; Levaggi/Levaggi 2007: 5ff. 
62  For example Ramsay 1998: 21, van Vliet 2002: 299. 
63  Ahlamaa-Tuompo et al. 1998 a and b, Ahlamaa-Tuompo 1999. 
64  Wedig 1988: 158ff; Newhouse 1993; Remler/Atherly 2003: 277f. 
65  Gertler/Hammer 1997: 8f. 
66  For example Contoyannis et al. 2005: 910. It is surprising, however, that economists obvi-
ously have little faith in the capability of such a rationally acting subject is capable to prese-
lect health insurance contracts or modalities according to his/her own preferences or needs, 
because many a decision that appears to be moral-hazard-driven could perfectly well be the 
result of purposeful pre-selection (cf. Geoffard 2000: 128, 132). 
67  Gertler/Hammer 19967: 9f; Geoffard 2000: 132. 
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elasticity estimates normally result from changes in take-up under particular prede-
fined co-payment conditions, often on the basis of individual experimental or quasi-
experimental observations.68 These are all based on a wide range of hypotheses, conjec-
ture and primarily economic theories,69 whose relation to reality rarely withstands 
critical examination.70 Especially in the United States, where much of the research 
about price elasticity of pharmaceuticals and other health services comes from, meas-
uring utilisation turns out to be tricky because in real life – unlike under experimental 
conditions – it is subject to selection effects, overestimates caused by skewed distribu-
tion of spending across different patient collectives71 and effects of the “moral risk” 
which they in turn seem to demonstrate.72 
A health expert who thinks in broader terms than the purely econometric is left 
speechless by calculations where some economists draw conclusions about demand for 
hospital treatment under particular conditions of insurance and cost-sharing on the 
basis of very specific findings73 from a small sample.74 There is no way of getting round 
the question of whether hospital treatment can really adequately be classified as a con-
sumer good whose use is primarily determined by whim and current ability to pay and 
in no way depends on individual or collective health or social factors. And such a per-
spective completely ignores the possibility that a decision (influenced by patient cost-
sharing) not to seek medical treatment for a condition could lead to a real or subjective 
deterioration in health status and this in turn to reduced work productivity75 – and to 
slower economic growth.76 Conversely, free health coverage might lead not to the gen-
erally presupposed moral hazard and resulting welfare losses but instead to welfare 
gains through income security, maintenance of productivity and alleviation of suffer-
ing. 
Many economic models of price elasticity do not even rudimentarily include such 
effects and the associated complexity,77 and only in isolated cases happens a critical and 
restricting examination of the theory-based statements addressing for example the 
                                                  
68  Manning et al. 1987: 267f; Winkelmann 2004: 1084f; Stein 2003: 44; Buntin et al. 2006: 
W518. 
69  Markus et al. 1998: 17; Pauly/Ramsay 1999: 445f; Osterkamp 2003b: 80f; Hilitris 2004: 19; 
Contoyannis et al. 2005: 917. 
70  A noticeable feature, and one worthy of systematic quantitative-semantic analysis, is the 
frequent use of verbs such as “suggest”, “believe”, “assume” or “possibly” in the international 
literature on moral hazard and demand-side policy approaches in health financing. In the 
description of methods and results, these terms build an obvious contrast to the mostly very 
concrete quantitative appraisals and calculations. In some cases the authors mention at least 
elementary limitations of their model quotations, though without taking them adequately 
into consideration for the interpretation of their findings (e.g. Manning/Marquis 1996: 632f). 
71  Remler/Atherly 2003: 270, 278f. 
72  Cf. Shea et al. 2007: 936. 
73  Finkelstein 2004: 20f. 
74  This applies, for example, to the universally quoted RAND experiment, on which basic as-
sumptions regarding co-payment effects are founded to this day. This paper will address 
this natural experiment in more depth in Chapter 9. 
75  Jinnett et al. 2007: 7ff. 
76  Dow et al. 2000: 9f, 24; cf. also SVR 2003b. 
77  Cf. Russell 1996: 221; cf. Also Remler/Atherly 2003: 277f. 
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inadequate recording the unequal distributions of health status78 and the lack of con-
sideration of different populations or insurance conditions. Possible or even probable 
changes in various other parameters through or at least parallel to the measured vari-
ables and effects regularly drop out of the frame on the basis of the ceteris paribus hy-
pothesis. There can be no doubting the following assessment of cost-sharing: “The im-
pact of this instrument is especially evident within the model world of economics.”79 
For the sake of completeness we must add that this study shows that the evidence re-
mains restricted exclusively to the world of economic modelling. 
 
5 The Dogma of “Individual Responsibility” 
The demand for more “individual responsibility” permeates the health policy discussion 
in most welfare states.80 In the (West) German reform debate individual responsibility 
for their own health has played an increasingly important role over the past three dec-
ades.81 The ideology of individual responsibility receives support especially from the 
employers’ organisations and allied experts, from physicians’ representatives, and from 
the Christian democratic and liberal parties, but also from social democratic leaders and 
parts of the Green Party. 
The ideological superstructure of the reform agenda is held up by a combination of 
social and economic liberalism, in the sense of an understanding of freedom based on 
civil liberties. Individual self-determination and self-realisation of “responsible citi-
zens” represent broadly accepted values of democratic societies. At the same time – in 
political synergy – the free-market economy has established itself more or less as the 
economic counterpart to democracy, where the state is primarily responsible for “en-
suring an economic order that guarantees freedom” and personal liberty is inseparably 
linked to the free-market system.82 From this perspective public interventions in the 
free play of market forces and the placing of any form of obligation on the members of 
a polity – for example in the scope of the social insurance systems of developed coun-
tries – represent coercive measures with the potential to distort the market. 
The Ottawa Charter of 1986 established the right to self-determination as a funda-
mental and global principle of health and in particular of health promotion: “Health 
promotion is the process of enabling people to increase control over, and to improve, 
                                                  
78  For example Remler/Atherly 2003: 278f. 
79  “Die Wirkung dieses Instruments wird besonders evident unter Zuhilfenahme der Modell-
welt der Volkswirtschaftslehre”: Schulenburg/Wieland 1984: 631. 
80  Cf. Bodenheimer 2005a: 851. 
81  The starting point was the Health Insurance Cost Containment Act of 1977, passed under the 
first coalition government of Social Democrats and Liberals in Germany. 
82  Pütz 2003: 34. Cf. also Breyer et al. 2005: 190. In this context it is worth mentioning that, 
specifically in health care systems, being characterised by pronounced external effects and 
heavy information asymmetry to the detriment of the patients who are the perceived cli-
ents, the general postulate of economic liberalism that individuals ought to be responsible 
for the consequences of their actions is subject to inherent practical restrictions. 
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their health.”83 Behind this there is an unmistakable emancipatory approach, where 
social justice and equality of opportunity play a central role in efforts to improve health 
alongside environmental, labour and other living conditions: “Health promotion action 
aims at reducing differences in current health status and ensuring equal opportunities 
and resources to enable all people to achieve their fullest health potential.”83 
Behind the smokescreen of a social policy debate dominated by supposed financial 
constraints, the question of individual responsibility has come to define the social pol-
icy discourse in a quite different sense in recent years.84 The idea of “self-inflicted ill-
nesses” has successfully found its way into popular and scientific publications. Propos-
als to exclude the consequences of accidents and high-risk sport injuries from statutory 
health insurance coverage and the latest decision on side-effects of tattooing and pierc-
ing85 jostle with ideas on how to cap publicly shared insurance protection for lung-
cancer in smokers and other “self-inflicted” health problems. The confirmed finding 
that many patho- and salutogenetic factors are in fact determined not exclusively indi-
vidually but to a great degree by social and environmental influences gets sidelined in 
the mainstream debate.86 An individual’s health status depends to an important extent 
on his or her socioeconomic living situation, and there is growing evidence for a ge-
netic etiology of many supposedly “self-inflicted” pathologies.87 
Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft (ISNM) in Cologne is one of the most promi-
nent groups lobbying for a restructuring of the German welfare state, working closely 
with the pro-business Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) to fan the widespread 
myths of a cost explosion in the health system, dramatic demographic problems and 
social insurance contributions destroying jobs.88 Deutsche Bank Research (which pre-
sents itself in all modesty as one of the world’s leading think tanks for economic, social 
and financial affairs) not only reproduces all the usual myths of the health debate, but 
explicitly calls for “tangible cost-sharing” to solve imminent funding problems.89 Calls 
to expand and increase patient cost-sharing are among the standard demands of em-
ployers organisations and the conservative and liberal parties.90 The Kronberger Kreis91 
                                                  
83  WHO 1986: 1. 
84  For example Fink 2002. 
85  The 2006 health sector reform in Germany called “Statutory Health Insurance Competition 
Strengthening Act” of 2006 (GKV-WSG) implemented, for the first time in history, exclusions 
from public health insurance coverage for all treatments which are attributable to self-
inflicted procedures, namely tattooing and piercing. 
86  For example Brauer et al. 2002: 1094f; M. Finkelstein et al. 2003: 399f; Mielck 2005: 26ff; 
Wheeler/Ben-Shlomo 2005: 952ff; Gehring et al. 2006: 548f; Laurent et al. 2007; 
Dockery/Stone 2007: 511f; Elliot et al. 2007 (3rd page). 
87  In this strongly ideological debate, it is enlightening to observe that many advocates of 
more “self-responsibility” can be found among the very same neoliberal “modernisers” who 
agitate in favour of intensifying genetic research, arguing that is has the potential to im-
prove future treatment options for diseases with genetic aetiology that cannot yet be ade-
quately treated. 
88  INSM (undated); Gerken/Raddatz 2002: 10f. 
89  Deutsche Bank Research (undated): 7. 
90  Ruf 1982: 21f; Deppe 1987: 82, 161f; Spiegel online 2006 a, b. 
91  The Kronberger Kreis, created by Wolfram Engels in 1982, is a pool of German economic and 
political scientists who are mainly engaged in regulatory issues. 
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also says that to solve the existing problems “the regulatory insurance business idea of 
the health system” needs to be “placed on a new footing”92 and recommends a series of 
measures to increase patients’ participation in financing their health.93 
Even the economic textbooks seem to be largely unimpressed by empirical research 
and discussion, and inculcate each new generation of students with platitudes that have 
little to do with reality and much with belief.94 The pharmaceuticals industry, too, is 
especially interested in strengthening consumer autonomy by abolishing irritating “co-
ercive measures” such as the ban on drug advertising and the prescription requirement 
for most effective medications. The industry cites how supposedly well informed the 
population is to make autonomous lay decisions.95 “These days 41 percent of all medi-
cines sold in Germany and 68 percent of all non-prescription medicines are acquired by 
patients on their own initiative as self-medication.”96 
The call for greater patient participation in health care,97 which has found its way 
into the international reform debate in industrialised countries as “patient empower-
ment”, basically pulls in the same direction.98 Superficially in line with the Ottawa 
Charter,99 “patient empowerment” focuses on improving the position of the “customer” 
in the health care market and systematically overlooks the problems of social exclusion 
and inequality of opportunity. Furthermore, this approach neglects the fact that a not 
insignificant number of patients are only too pleased to hand responsibility for solving 
their medical problems to their doctors and are only willing to participate in decision-
making processes after specific encouragement and guidance.100 Nonetheless, market-
oriented ideas of participation and decision-sharing have found their way, for example, 
into the US healthcare system under the innocuous-sounding term “consumer-driven” 
or “consumer-directed health care”.101 Under this banner the insurance business pushes 
policies with high deductibles and individual health saving accounts,102 which they hope 
will strengthen the demand side.103 
                                                  
92  Donges et al. 2002: 4. 
93  Donges et al. 2002: 84ff. 
94  Cited in evidence are Schulenburg 1987 (p. 175) and the “standard work” on health econom-
ics by Breyer et al. (2005), which unscrupulously uses terms such as “cost explosion” (p. 190) 
and “increased drug cost sharing of the insured” as an “alternative to public drug price 
regulation” (p. 471, footnote 7); cf. also Rothman 1992: 443, 452. 
95  BAH 1999a. 
96  BAH 1999b, author’e emphasis; cf. also Zok 2006. 
97  O’Brien et al. 2000: 12. 
98  Cf. also Cornwell/Gaventa 2001: 11f. As explained more in detail in Chapter 3, a not-
insubstantial number of patients are willing and quite glad to leave the responsibility for 
resolving upcoming health problems to medical professionals, though most want to partici-
pate in decision-making (Deber et al. 2001: 1417ff; Steinbach et al. 2004: 2f). 
99  WHO 2004b. 
100  Deber et al. 2001: 1417ff; Steinbach et al. 2004: 2f. 
101  Gabel et al. 2002a: W395f; Garber 2004: 293; Buntin et al. 2006: w516f. 
102  Parente 2002:  1192; Fronstin 2004: 1, 5; Buntin et al. 2006: 517f; Goodman 2006: w541; 
Miller 2006: w550. 
103  Gabel et al. 2004: W399. 
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German economists, too, hope that such measures will increase “consumer sover-
eignty” in the health market,104 believing that sufficiently high financial incentives on 
the patient side will not only stem moral hazard behaviour but also put an effective 
brake on provider-driven demand increases.105 However, even such supposedly emanci-
patory approaches cannot hide the fact that the ultimate outcome will be an increasing 
redistribution of health costs to the detriment of citizens in general and in particular 
the less healthy members of society.106 
There are anyway good grounds to doubt whether this approach to enhancing the 
customer’s wishes and individual responsibility actually improves the efficiency of 
health care. Providing incentives to cut costs through cost-sharing and co-payments 
aggravates the danger of underuse of medical care.107 In particular with regard to early 
treatment and health expenditure there is evidence that “consumer-oriented” contracts 
tend to lead to risk selection108 and are more attractive to better-educated sections of 
society.109 Also, initial observations indicating a decrease in the use of medical services 
as a whole but an apparently more frequent need for hospital treatment than before 
could be a consequence of failure to consult a practitioner in good time.110 Finally, the 
insurance funds demonstrate a conspicuous lack of creativity and innovation in provid-
ing graduated cost-sharing and charges to accommodate low-income groups.111 
 
6 The Political Economy of Direct Cost-sharing 
Introducing or increasing patient cost-sharing means shifting costs to patients,112 and 
hence placing an ever-increasing burden of health spending on the weakest actors in 
health policy. This development is the outcome of a manifestly unequal distribution of 
political power in health policy. One example of this is employer-funded health insur-
ance as practised in the United States, where it is easier offload costs onto members 
than onto employers.113 This is noteworthy to the extent that this realisation is a recent 
phenomenon, and in fact experts originally expected stiff and widespread resistance to 
increased co-payments.114 
It has not escaped insurees’ notice that they are bearing the brunt of the privatisa-
tion of costs. Opinion polls suggest that the restructuring of the insurance systems to 
more “customer orientation” and freedom of choice do not increase acceptance of the 
                                                  
104  For example Pütz 2003: 42f. 
105  Fraser-Institute 1999; Kephardt et al. 2003; Goodman 2006: w541. 
106  Gabel 2002b: W401; Davis 2004: 1219ff. 
107  Rosenthal/Milstein 2004: 1068ff.; cf. also Lohr et al. 1986b: 540ff. 
108  Parente et al. 2004a: 1106f; Davis 2004: 1224f. 
109  Parente et al. 2004a: 1108f. 
110  Parente et al. 2004b: 1198f; Davis 2004: 1224. 
111  Tu/Ginsburg 2007: 4f. 
112  Schulenburg 1984b: 1278. 
113  Fronstin 2004: 14; Prada et al. 2004: 41; Trude/Grossman 2004: 1f; Weinick et al. 2005: 504; 
Blumenthal 2006a: 85; Ross 2006: w553; McDevitt et al. 2007: 213f. 
114  Freiman 1984: 90; Hibbard/Weeks 1988: 244. 
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system at all.115 Surveys from the United States, where the co-payment ratio is very 
high, show relatively low approval for the system and the quality of care tends to be 
regarded as unsatisfactory.116 Overall satisfaction with the health system there is lower 
than in countries with broad or universal social protection and significantly lower co-
payments.117 Surveys from Chile, where health insurance clients also have to pay a con-
siderable share of their health costs out of pocket, incidentally show similar results.118 
In Croatia, too, surveys show that women and low-income groups are especially dissat-
isfied with the health care system because of rising out-of-pocket payments and ineq-
uitable distribution of the financial burden.119 
Finally, introducing cost-sharing also serves to make up lost income for service 
providers who generally also feel the effects of cost-containing measures on their own 
revenues. The political influence of the various providers in the health care system is 
generally much greater than that of fund members and patients. Finally, in many coun-
tries the health system is one of the largest and often fastest-growing sectors of the 
economy, and represents an important growth factor even in the poorest states.120 
 
7 Forms of Direct Cost-sharing 
Various forms of material and immaterial incentive are available for demand-side 
management in health care and for implementing the widespread demand for “more 
individual responsibility”.121 This study concentrates on patients’ direct pecuniary share 
of treatment costs. Unlike insurance contributions paid in advance and independent of 
actual use of health services, out-of-pocket payments for health care are designed to 
increase patients’ consumer awareness and the transparency of take-up behaviour for 
health services. 
                                                  
115  More than a few theoreticians try to make people believe that health care systems are un-
dergoing a crisis of acceptance because many insured people feel exploited by collective so-
cial protection. Here again, rational utility-maximisers are assumed to prefer systems that 
attach high importance to self-responsibility and prevent “parasitism”. 
116  Schoen et al. 2005: W5-512ff; Davis et al. 2006: 4ff, 16ff; Lee/Zapert 2005: 1203. 
117  Blendon et al. 1990: 188f; Blendon et al. 2002: 182f. 
118  Holst 2004: 276ff. 
119  Miroslav/Babić-Bosanac 2002: 421; Mastilica/Kušec 2005: 224f. 
120  In China, for instance, the health budget increased yearly by 13 percent between 1996 and 
2002, even faster than the impressive pace of growth in China’s national economy (Meessen 
et al. 2003: 582). 
121  Cf. e.g. Stuart/Stockton 1973: 346 and 348. Explicitly, these comprise not only the different 
forms of co-payment and co-insurance but also bonus-malus systems which have garnered 
general approval despite the lack of any empirical foundation. In the German context, for in-
stance, the latest paper on the effects of merit rating systems in dental prevention and 
maintenance based only on model estimations dates from the 1980s (Schneider 1988). There 
is a lack of more recent validations of the positive assumptions regarding boni and mali, at 
least in Germany. 
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Most social security and health insurance systems include out-of-pocket payments. 
They are relatively widespread for medicines122 and other treatments, but there is noth-
ing to prevent service-providers also charging for surgery visits, hospital stays, item-
ised diagnostic and therapeutic services, episodes of sickness123 or globally for any use 
during a particular period. Cost-sharing encompasses all the costs that households are 
required to cover in direct temporal connection with the utilisation of health care ser-
vices.124 Health insurance contributions, on the other hand, are not out-of-pocket pay-
ments because they are made in advance and are not related to use of services. 
Table 1: Forms of out-of-pocket payment 
Form Definition 
Direct payment 
(selective exclusion) 
Payments for goods or services that are not covered by 
any form of pre-payment or insurance. 
Cost-sharing 
 
 
A provision of most health funding systems that requires 
the individual who is covered to pay part of the cost of 
health care received; often referred to as user charges. 
Informal payment Unofficial payments for goods or services that should be 
fully funded from pooled revenue; sometimes referred to 
as envelope or under-the-table payments. 
Table 2: Forms of direct cost-sharing 
Form Definition 
Co-payment The user pays a fixed (small) fee per item or service 
(flat rate). 
Co-insurance The user pays a fixed or variable proportion of the total 
cost, with the insurer paying the remaining proportion. 
Deductible/ extra billing The user bears a fixed amount of the costs, with any  
excess borne by the insurer; deductibles can apply to 
specific cases or a period of time 
Source: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.125 
 
From the perspective of the insurance business there are four basic types of patient co-
payment: flat fees; charge per service or package, co-insurance; deductibles and balance 
billing or extra billing.126 Of course, combinations of these basic types are also possi-
ble.127 International research generally distinguishes between user fees, which are 
                                                  
122  Willison et al. 2001: 24f. 
123  Stierle 1998: 1. 
124  Cf. Galbraith et al. 2005: 2. 
125  Jemiai et al. 2004: 1; with supplementary material from Schachenhofer 1997 (pp. 161ff), 
Rosian et al. 2002 (pp. 20ff) and Bodenheimer 2005 (p. 851). 
126  Cf. Rubin/Mendelson 1995: 2-15f, 2-159ff; Schachenhofer 1997: 161ff; Halton 2000: 1f; Ro-
binson 2002: 162f; Skinner 2002: 14; Rosian et al. 2002: 20ff; Irvine/Green 2003: 33; Knappe 
2003: 238f. 
127  For example Parente et al. 2004. 
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charged by public and other institutions where treatment should theoretically be free, 
and co-payments or co-insurance made in addition to an insured person’s normal 
health insurance contributions. 
Actuaries advise insurers to use deductibles (extra billing) primarily where there is 
a tendency for excessive use of the insured services with the possible consequence of 
economic losses. “Deductibles” represent a particular amount, generally defined in the 
contract, that the insured person has to contribute themselves, even for minor claims. 
Deductibles face policy-holders with an “all-or-nothing” decision,128 because they have 
to pay all medical (and hospital) bills up to a particular limit defined in the policy out of 
their own pocket, before the insurance will cover the further costs.129 Deductibles can 
apply both to individual services or service packages (franchise deductible) or for all 
medical and para-medical care during a particular period (absolute franchise).130 In 
these systems there is an upper limit on a household’s healthcare burden, although this 
does not obviate the regressive nature of this form of cost-sharing, because the same 
absolute contribution will represent very different proportions of different households’ 
incomes. 
The main purpose of deductibles is to reduce utilisation and accounting work for 
minor treatments. Deductibles can reduce an insurance fund’s spending in two different 
ways, by reducing spending on services and by cutting the administrative costs of proc-
essing minor claims.131 The inversely proportional actuarial relationship between de-
ductibles and insurance contribution allows the level of contributions to be varied ac-
cording to the level of deductible, assuming other conditions remain unchanged. This 
approach is common in private-sector insurance,132 but is also found in Switzerland’s 
quasi-public insurance market.133 Graduated deductibles also function as an economic 
incentive for patients to prioritise cheaper service-providers and medicines.134 
According to commonplace actuarial theory, if patient-side moral hazard leads to 
increased demand for health services, funds should introduce flat-rate or proportional 
co-payments for particular medical, para-medical and dental or orthodontic treat-
ments.135 In order to neutralise the insured person’s supposed information advantage 
regarding his or her own health status the contribution should correlate with the actual 
cost. So either the frequency of use or the complexity or price of the treatment should 
influence the level of contribution, in order to create an incentive for the health insur-
ance customer to keep their own losses – and thus the fund’s costs – as small as possi-
ble.136 
Here proportional co-payments are assumed to have a stronger influence than flat-
rate co-payments on the cost-efficiency of decisions by fund members claiming for 
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healthcare services. Proportional patient cost-sharing reduces insurance fund spending 
per treatment, but discourages the consumer from searching the market for cheaper 
service-providers.137 Actuarial expositions of this ilk generally fail to mention that pro-
portional co-payments (where the insured person pays a certain percentage of the bill) 
are especially financially threatening for lower-income groups because expensive, ur-
gent or long-term treatments can place an excessive financial burden on individual 
households.138 
Less attention is given to maximum service limits, although Medicare and many in-
surers in the United States use them for medicines.139 In contrast to the extra billing 
system, the service limit relates not to individual treatments or medicines but to a 
group of services for particular conditions or to particular periods. Risk limits of this 
kind also exist in developing countries and countries in transition, where they apply to 
all services and sometimes even occur in combination with percentage coverage. Maxi-
mum service limits represent a kind of absolute risk limitation or deductible for the 
insurer. Patients pay all costs exceeding the maximum permitted volume of treatment 
themselves.140 
Private health insurers typically apply a very wide variety of combinations of the 
various forms of cost-sharing, which are defined in the individual contracts. Where in-
surance is non-compulsory (for example in the United States or Australia) people who 
currently have a low health risk tend to choose products with less comprehensive cov-
erage while the chronically sick and other risk groups prefer to restrict the financial 
burden of co-payments.141 
 
8 Promising “Optimal Co-Payments” 
In order to protect lower-income groups better from unwanted effects of cost-sharing, 
neo-classical economists increasingly recommend “optimal co-payments”.142 Using so-
phisticated mathematical models, Norwegian researcher Hoel, for example, investigated 
the possible effects of different scenarios on welfare gains in societies with public so-
cial security systems. Working from the assumption that health spending is primarily a 
function of the insured person’s individual preferences, and that willingness to pay is a 
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decisive variable for use of medical treatment Hoel concludes that differentiated co-
payments promote equality and can increase the welfare gains of all citizens. And the 
Italians Laura and Rosella Levaggi calculate “optimal co-payments” not just as a source 
of additional resources but even as elements of income redistribution.143  
However, it must be said that these models are based on a breathtaking volume of 
interconnected assumptions and simplifications of the kind outlined earlier. The au-
thors rashly presume that the risk of becoming ill is evenly distributed across the 
whole population,144 contradicting accepted research on social determinants and ine-
qualities in health.145 What is more, the theoretical assumptions plainly apply only to 
illnesses that can be completely cured for a price that can be determined in advance. 
That is not the case with chronic pathologies, and consequently what is now the largest 
group of illnesses is not adequately accounted for in these models. Less serious in com-
parison with such fundamental limitations is the criticism that it remains completely 
unclear why and how people who decide to do without medical treatment because of the 
level of existing co-payments are supposed to benefit from increasing cost-sharing.146 
Nor does the hypothetical assumption of an “optimally progressive tax system” do any-
thing for the practical relevance of these ideas.147 
For Germany’s statutory health insurance system individual authors also propose a 
sliding scale of co-payments linked to income and illness.148 Differentiating the co-
payment rates by income and cost of treatment would ultimately mean that every per-
son covered by statutory health insurance in Germany would be better off than before 
after the introduction of such co-payments – even people with a low income and simul-
taneously high treatment costs. Under certain preconditions, in combination with an as 
yet undetermined “socially accepted maximum co-payment rate”, it could be possible to 
reduce the rate of insurance contributions as a percentage of income by between 1.9 
and 2.6 percentage points.149 
This line of argument assumes that the utilisation of services by people with health 
insurance is both excessive and an expression of moral hazard, rather than of compre-
hensible medical needs; that only the healthy would reduce their demand for medical 
treatment; and that the increased revenue would make it possible to reduce contribu-
tion rates (premiums) for everyone.150 Following the logic of Pareto efficiency “positive” 
co-payments not otherwise defined in any detail are here supposed to lead to improved 
allocation in the health system from which all insured persons would ultimately bene-
fit.151 This approach thus stands in the unbroken tradition of a worrying detachment 
from reality that has characterised conventional economic ideas and proposals.152 All 
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too often they are based on a multitude of assumptions that flow into the models with-
out critical examination and lead to overblown conclusions.153 There is also no sign that 
the authors adequately factored in the impact of the intended and expected fall in 
treatment take-up when they estimated the additional revenues through co-payments; 
often the estimate of additional income appears to be based simply on the level of cur-
rent demand. And the models regularly neglect the administrative costs,154 even though 
following the imposition of co-payments and especially the introduction of exemptions 
they are bound to have an impact on the level of contributions and will hence probably 
consume part of the gains forecast from increased revenue and spending cuts.155 
Above all, however, the distinction posited by the moral hazard theorem between 
sensible and unjustified treatment belongs in the realm of fiction.156 Not only do the 
demand for medical care and patients’ behaviour fail to obey the theoretical expecta-
tions, but the assumptions concerning the seriousness of illnesses do not match up to 
reality either.157 Thus economic approaches normally follow the simplistic assumption 
that unused services produce savings fully equivalent to their cost, and hence com-
pletely ignore the issue of the possible consequential and additional costs resulting 
from non-treatment. At least one or two authors appear to guess that savings and effi-
ciency in the health sector could be associated with welfare losses as a consequence of 
reduced treatment rates.158 
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In practice the reach of the “optimisation approaches” has remained weak and is 
always restricted to a small proportion of insured persons who benefit from exemp-
tions and hardship clauses. Often exemptions are given to particular groups rather than 
applying a differentiated sliding scale. Thus in Germany in 2003 almost half of all pre-
scriptions (48 percent) were exempt from co-payments. As well as children and preg-
nant women, anyone who has spent 2 percent of their annual income on health care 
(for the chronically sick 1 percent) is entitled to benefit from the hardship clause. The 
number of insured persons exempt from co-payments rose steeply from 326,921 in 
1997 to 2,188,699 in 2003.159 
Despite these measures the chronically sick bear a disproportionate financial bur-
den. Because the frequency of prescriptions increases with age,160 the financial burden 
of cost-sharing also rises continuously, reaching its peak among men aged over 90 (an-
nual mean €83.46) and women aged between 85 and 89 (annual mean €70.92). The gen-
der-specific pattern of frequency of exemption from charges confirms, incidentally, that 
older women in particular are exposed to an increased risk of poverty.161 Overall the vol-
ume of co-payments in the statutory health insurance system rose from approx. €6.6 
billion in 1992 to €8.6 billion in 1996 and 9.8 billion in 2000.162 
The effectiveness of such exemption rules is fundamentally restricted by the high 
administrative costs, difficulties in implementation and the ensuing costs.163 Targeted 
social subsidies present great difficulties even for highly developed countries.164 Even 
in well-organised countries like Switzerland, exemptions and subsidies generate new 
difficulties and inequalities, as seen for example in the allocative problems associated 
with public health insurance subsidies for low-income groups.165 
Only the private health insurance market in the United States has any significant 
experience with tiered cost-sharing. Income-related cost sharing, which causes com-
paratively little administrative expense at least for larger insurers, is certainly not a 
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new idea,166 but for a long time it was applied only by a few employer-based private-
sector insurers.167 By 2002 no more than 5 percent of US American employees had HMO 
or PPO contracts with tiered deductibles for hierarchising choice of non-drug medical 
services within a provider network.168 In the field of medicines the proportion of poli-
cies with supplier-dependent and product-dependent co-payments has risen more 
quickly. The proportion of employer-funded policies with incentive formularies rose 
from 46 to 69 percent between 2000 and 2002. Almost three out of every five of these 
contracts include three or more different classes of drugs and co-payment. Today com-
paratively comprehensive medication coverage with tiered co-payments has become 
the norm for US health insurers.169 
Particularly in a health system without universal coverage, where the individual’s 
insurance protection is sometimes patchy, a tiered co-payment system raises consider-
able ethical problems.170 All these increasingly sophisticated attempts to contain grow-
ing health sector expenditure build on the assumption that patient demand is insatia-
ble. Economic theory claims that if medicines are completely or largely free for insured 
patients, everyone will take as many as they can. Leaving aside the problems actually 
observed with antibiotics and Ritalin in certain countries, this interpretation ignores 
the regulating effect of obligatory prescription by medical experts, whose behaviour is 
unlikely to be influenced either by flat-rate or tiered co-payments. But above all, there 
is not a scrap of evidence for patient-driven overuse of the medicine supply in indus-
trialised countries. Closer analysis of insurance data collected for the RAND experiment 
brought to light widespread underdiagnosis and consequentially inadequate treatment 
of chronic conditions.171 A systematic MEDLINE search also failed to produce any evi-
dence for the widely posited overuse of medicines, and instead pointed to a situation of 
underprovision.172 
Following this introductory review of the theory and concepts, the following chap-
ters will revisit some of the assumptions on which neo-classical economists base their 
models. As well as a dearth of scientific evidence, we find above all effects that are both 
unforeseen and undesirable. Ultimately the current recommendations to make patients 
contribute to the costs of their treatment would appear to actually be counterproductive 
for the proper functioning of health systems. Recent data suggests that such financial 
barriers impair access to medical services in sometimes unplanned ways and harm the 
population’s health status.  
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9 The “Health Insurance Experiment” and Its Evidence 
To this day the controlled, randomised Health Insurance Experiment in California173 (the 
RAND study) is regarded as the major investigation of moral hazard in health insur-
ance.174 Although it was conducted back in the mid-1970s, many of the hypotheses and 
recommendations concerning cost-sharing and user charges in the health sector are 
still based on the RAND Corporation’s findings.175 The study investigated the service 
utilisation behaviour of a population of 5,809 US citizens and their dependants under 
different co-payment modalities,176 focusing on the relationship between cost-sharing 
and use of medical facilities, health spending and health outcomes.177 The researchers 
allocated the participants, most of whom were relatively young and all under 65, ran-
domly to one of fourteen different health insurance policies and observed their behav-
iour for three to five years. 
All the contracts paid service-providers on a fee-for-service basis and implemented 
an upper limit for cost-sharing. The co-payment modalities varied: one contract offered 
treatment free of any out-of-pocket payment; three offered a 50 percent co-payment 
with upper limits of 5, 10 and 15 percent of household income up to a maximum of 
$1,000; three others had 95 percent co-payments with the same upper limits; three 
contracts had 50 percent cost-sharing for psychiatric and dental treatment and 25 per-
cent for all other services, also with the same upper limits; while one policy covered all 
the costs of hospital treatment in full combined with 95 percent co-payments for all 
outpatient services up to a limit of $150 per person and $450 per family.178 
If visits to the dentist were excluded, there was an inverse correlation between the 
level of co-payment and the frequency of medical treatment. Whereas the latter was 
86.7 percent among insured persons with full cost coverage it fell to 68.0 percent as the 
level of out-of-pocket payment rose. At the same time, a fall of up to one third was ob-
served in average health spending per person.179 Because of the use of upper limits, the 
actual average co-payments were considerably lower than the nominal rates in all 
groups, namely: 16 percent for the group with 25 percent cost-sharing, 24 percent for 
those with 50 percent cost-sharing and 31 percent for those who in theory had 95 per-
cent cost-sharing.180 
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It was also found that the effect of co-payments occurred almost exclusively at first 
contact with health institutions and had only a negligible influence on subsequent use 
of health services in any given episode of sickness.181 Differences in dependency on co-
payment conditions were found among different types of services. For example, the 
frequency of admission to hospital paediatric wards varied considerably less than out-
patient psychiatric treatment.182 The RAND experts explain this phenomenon partly as 
an effect of different degrees of price elasticity in the health market, which like every 
commodity depends both on the “customer’s” ability to pay and the complexity of the 
medical service involved. Another important influencing factor is the level of out-of-
pocket payment to be borne by the patient, because as co-payment rose so did the price 
elasticity of the various health services.183 
Those who had policies with cost-sharing used medical facilities about one third 
less than those whose insurance covered the full costs of their treatment. Setting aside 
the epidemiologically significant findings of poorer blood pressure control, less fre-
quent eye tests and poorer dental care (caries and gum disease), the initial investigation 
found that those with cost-sharing were actually slightly healthier than those who had 
no co-payments.184 The authors of the RAND study initially concluded that greater use of 
medical facilities by persons with full cost coverage by their health insurer had no or 
negligible influence on health status and that no significant differences between the 
different insurance groups could be found in relation to mortality risk or health prob-
lems.185 The considerably lower take-up of cancer screening programmes had no influ-
ence on outcomes during the albeit relatively short period of observation.186 
However, the dental sector illustrates very clearly the problems involved in assess-
ing the effectiveness of co-payments merely by recording visits. The RAND study pro-
duced consistent evidence that higher co-payments for dental treatment lead to poorer 
dental health among adults. If out-of-pocket payments are required, children less often 
receive orthodontic treatment, and among those from poorer and less educated families 
dental care as a whole is poorer.187 Spending on dental treatment rose by 46 percent 
following the abolition of 95 percent co-payments, with demand rising especially dur-
ing the first year after the introduction of free dental treatment.188 
Over the course of time closer scrutiny of the RAND study by independent experts 
brought to light many questionable and downright dubious assumptions and conclu-
sions. Closer examination of patient behaviour in the study also revealed the notewor-
thy finding that co-payments reduced not only the number of “unjustified” visits to the 
practitioner, but also the number of necessary consultations and preventive measures, 
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leading to worse vision189 and blood pressure control190 especially among the chroni-
cally sick. Cost-sharing also had negative effects on the indicators for the population 
groups with the worst health and the lowest income, and noticeably shortened the life 
expectancy of high-risk patients: free medical treatment reduced the mortality risk of 
this group by 10 percent.191 Overall in the RAND study the co-payments affected the 
lowest-income and unhealthiest two fifths of the population especially harshly.192 Low-
income hypertension sufferers were cared for better in the full-coverage model than 
under insurance conditions with cost-sharing.193 The prevalence of symptoms such as 
angina pectoris, respiratory distress, haemorrhage or weight loss was 26 percent higher 
in this group compared to the better-off and considerably lower in the group without 
co-payments as a whole.194 
Many experts concluded from the RAND study that the cost-containing effects of 
cost-sharing would be achieved at the expense of the consumers of health services. But 
a study with a relatively small cohort of not even six thousand families and random 
allocation to the different insurance modalities does not really allow conclusions to be 
drawn about the system as a whole. In this design each physician dealt with only a 
small group of participating patients, which precludes drawing any conclusions about 
global cost developments.195 Co-payments must apply to all patients equally if they are 
to have any cost-reducing effect at all.196 Apart from changes in insured persons or pa-
tients, the behaviour of service-providers also has the potential to counteract any cost-
saving reduction in real or presumed moral hazard behaviour by the members of a 
health insurance fund. This reinforces the doubts that the introduction of user charges 
can act as a brake on rising costs in the health system as a whole.197 
Plainly the concentration on patient co-payments for a long time distracted atten-
tion from another finding of the RAND study: that the method of payment to service 
providers is more effective than patient cost-sharing for containing costs. Health ex-
penditure on insured persons in co-payment-free HMO contracts was namely 38 per-
cent lower than for persons whose health insurance provided for fee-for-service pay-
ment.198 Furthermore, the RAND study also indicates how difficult it is to measure the 
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effect of insurance protection on health status. It is unlikely that the experiment and 
survey themselves will have had no influence on the participants’ perception of their 
own health, and measuring an “objective” health status is a very complex matter which 
is unlikely to be adequately covered by measuring a couple of parameters.199 
This fundamental problem is further exacerbated in studies based on rather subjec-
tive health indicators, because the simple fact of contact with the health system pro-
duces systematic measuring errors that depend – alongside social class – especially on 
the utilisation of services and thus on their price. When the prices of medical services 
rise, subjective variables such as self-assessed general health status improve, at the 
same time as more objective indicators such as coping with the tasks of daily life dete-
riorate.200 Accordingly, when objective parameters are used a better health status is 
observed with free treatment than where co-payments are obligatory. But if we draw 
exclusively on subjective, self-assessed survey data, we tend to find that free health 
care encourages greater utilisation but produces a poorer health status.201 
Altogether the position in the international debate on co-payments in health occu-
pied to this day – despite its relatively small sample and very specific setting – by the 
massively influential RAND study is absolutely questionable. Its uncritical extrapolation 
to the system as a whole from specific, often experimentally gained findings in small 
samples that only inadequately record the health outcomes202 – which one could call the 
“RAND error” – is unjustified and misleading.203 Especially given that this experiment 
actually showed that demand for necessary treatment fell and take-up of medical ser-
vices shifted from lower-income to higher-income groups.204 Despite all the contradic-
tions and open questions, oversimplified conclusions from the RAND experiment to this 
day define the health policy and partly even the health science debate. “The RAND 
analysis continues the tradition of hope and hype,” write the US health economists 
Himmelstein and Woolhandler. “Unfortunately, behind their impressive predictions of 
savings lie a disturbing array of unproven assumptions, wishful thinking, and special 
effects.”205 
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10 Impact on Provision of Pharmaceuticals 
In most European countries cost-sharing primarily affects medicines and medical 
aids,206 dental treatment and prosthetics,207 and extra services associated with comfort 
and accommodation.208 In the welfare states cost-sharing for such services and privi-
leges is widely accepted.209 In the public health systems of the industrialised countries 
attempts to manage demand through co-payment arrangements concentrate especially 
on pharmaceuticals.210 Different routes are used to increase patients’ contribution to the 
cost of drugs – prescription charges (flat-rate co-payments per prescription or medi-
cine), absolute, tiered211 or proportional cost-sharing,212 coverage limits, and excluding 
particular drugs from reimbursement.213 
Medicines are generally regarded as health services with relatively high price elas-
ticity, whose consumption correlates closely with the level of co-payments.214 This is 
confirmed by the observation that between 1998 and 2000, when drug prices in the 
United States rose considerably more steeply than the consumer price index, the pro-
portion of drug prescriptions not filled rose from 9.5 to 13.1 percent.215 The combina-
tion of price rises and simultaneous co-payment increases had a particularly dramatic 
effect on Medicare members. People on low incomes plainly have a limited capacity to 
compensate for price rises for medical services through savings or by doing without 
other consumer goods.216 
A large retrospective study from the United States confirms that doubling even 
small drug co-payments causes measurable changes in medicine-taking behaviour. The 
effects vary quite widely depending on the class of substance: the biggest drop is ob-
served in non-steroid antiphlogistics (45 percent), followed by antihistamines (44 per-
cent), lipid-lowering drugs (34 percent), H2-receptor antagonists and proton pump in-
hibitors (33 percent), bronchodilators (32 percent),217 antihypertensives (26 percent),218 
                                                  
206  Saltman/Figueras 1996: 16; Creese 1997: 202; Robinson 2002: 161, 164. 
207  Jemiai et al. 12002, S.2; Ziniel 2004: 31. 
208  Böcken et al. 2000: 71. 
209  Hjertquist 2002: 2, Prada et al 2004: 41. At least in Germany, a perceptible paradigm shift  
can be observed because studies from the old Federal Republic during the 1970s found evi-
dence of a generally sceptical attitude of the population regarding the claim for more self-
responsibility and higher cost sharing for health care (Recke 1980: 80ff). 
210  Nink/Schröder 2004a: 166; Birkett et al. 2001: 104f; Greß et al. 2005: 7, 20ff, 34; cf. also Ram-
say/Esmail 2004: 42. 
211  Tiered drug co-payments are usually arranged in such a way that out-of-pocket payment is 
lowest for generics, moderate for preferred brand drugs and highest for nonpreferred brand 
products (Frank 2001: 120f; Motheral/Fairman 2001: 1298ff; Huskamp et al. 2003a: 150; Gar-
ber 2004: 292). 
212  de Wolf et al. 2005: 369; Lee/Hoo 2006: w546. 
213  Lexchin/Grootendorst 2002: 6; Rosian et al. 2002: 21; Busse et al. 2005: 332, 342f. 
214  Harris et al. 1990: 912ff; Kaczmarek 1999: 228, 234; Kozyrskyj 2001: 901; Lexchin/Grooten-
dorst 2002: 8; Chandra et al. 2007. 
215  Wilson et al. 2005. 
216  Wilson et al. 2005: 719f. 
217  Anti-cholinergics, anti-inflammatory asthma agents, leucotriene modulators, oral steroids 
and steroid inhalers, sympathomimetics and xanthines. 
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antidepressants (26 percent),219 and oral antidiabetic drugs (25 percent).220 In patients 
with chronic conditions and receiving constant treatment the effect of changes in co-
payments was smaller: people with depression reduced their dose of prescribed psycho-
tropic drugs by only 8 percent, and among people with arterial hypertension the con-
sumption of antihypertensives fell by 10 percent. Larger falls were recorded for con-
sumption of antiphlogistics by patients with chronic arthritis, of antihistamines by al-
lergics (31 percent) and of oral hypoglycemics by diabetics (23 percent).221 
Other calculations from the United States suggest that increasing the price of anti-
hypertensives by one dollar leads annual purchases to fall by 114 tablets per person.222 
Perceptible drug co-payments lead older and poorer citizens in particular to turn down 
prescriptions or fail to fill them, while others reduce the prescribed dose by taking 
them less often.223 Current studies demonstrate very clearly that older people respond 
especially sensitively to cost-sharing. It was found that cost considerations led nearly 
one in five older US citizens (18.3 percent) and one in four of the chronically sick to 
decide not fill their prescriptions. 15.8 percent of older people and 21.8 percent of the 
chronically ill regularly skipped doses in order to make a prescribed medicine last 
longer, and 12.4 and 18.5 percent took smaller doses for the same reason.224 A study 
from California shows that increasing drug co-payments by an average of $5, which 
corresponded roughly to a doubling, reduced prescription fill rates by 7–19 percent.225 
Overall, cost-induced non-adherence to medical recommendations is observed more 
often among people who need treatment than among healthy citizens.226 
                                                                                                                                                  
218  This group comprises angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors, calcium channel 
blockers, diuretics, β-blockers and angiotensin II receptor blockers. 
219  Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors and tricyclic antidepressants. 
220  Sulfonylureas, metformin, glitazones and other oral antidiabetic drugs. 
221  Goldman et al. 2004: 2347f. A more recent study that also measures the impact of disability 
costs and lost productivity corroborates the otherwise rarely captured effect on compliance 
for people with chronic arthritis (Jinnett et al. 2007). 
222  Blustein 2000: 226. 
223  Dustan et al. 1992: 852; Cox et al. 2001: 298f; Steinmann et al. 2001: 795f; Fairman et al. 
2001: 10, 19; Schneeweiss et al. 2002: 524f; Schafheutle et al. 2002: 190ff; Gibson et al. 
2005b: 736f. A representative survey among US citizens underpins the finding that more 
than one in every five adults has not filled at least one prescription during the last year for 
financial reasons; 14 percent declared that during the last year they had taken a prescrip-
tion drug in smaller doses than prescribed because of the cost. And 16 percent said they had 
taken a medication less frequently than prescribed to save money (Talyor/Leitman 2001). 
224  Wilson et al. 2007: 9. 
225  Chandra et al. 2007. 
226  Bluestein 2000: 219; Steinmann et al. 2001: 796; Taylor/Leitman 2002; Soumerai et al. 2006: 
1831ff; Taira et al. 2006: 681. During a telephone survey of 1010 adult US-citizens in No-
vember 2002, 18 percent had not asked for prescriptions because of the cost, and this pro-
portion rose to 33 percent of those in only fair or poor health, and to as much as 41 percent 
of those with monthly out-of-pocket payments of US$150 or more. Likewise, 15 and 18 per-
cent of all adults were using a lower dose or taking their drug less often, respectively, in or-
der to make prescriptions last longer; for the group with high co-payment burdens, 48 and 
46 percent respectively admitted to applying the strategies mentioned above (Tay-
lor/Leitman 2002: 1f). 
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Numerous US studies show that co-payments as a rule deter a particular proportion 
of patients from acquiring and taking prescribed medicines.227 One important cause – 
that is largely disregarded in the economic literature – is that especially with condi-
tions such as hypertension or lipid metabolic disorders the diagnosis is best made at a 
point where a layperson can derive only abstract benefit from taking a drug and has 
only theoretical considerations on which to base their consumer decision. So it is (inci-
dentally in agreement with the theory of rational consumer choice) no surprise that 
medicine-taking behaviour is very sensitive to patient co-payments.228 Those affected 
do not realise that – statistically speaking – they are running a 55 or 41 percent higher 
risk, respectively, of hospital admission or emergency treatment at an emergency de-
partment, especially if they belong to a socio-economic or epidemiological risk group.229 
The phenomenon that the US citizens who are poorest and have the greatest health 
problems consume the fewest medicines230 has worsened still further during recent 
years.231 
The US experience corresponds with that of other differently organised health sys-
tems, as illustrated by the Quebec Universal Drug Program in the Canadian province of 
Quebec, which introduced proportional cost-sharing for medicines in two steps begin-
ning in 1996.232 A retrospective study impressively demonstrates the impact of this 
measure on the medicine-taking behaviour of older and poorer citizens and the result-
ing overall effects. Following a “small” increase in drug co-payments consumption of 
essential medications fell by 9.12 percent among older people and by even more, 14.42 
percent, among welfare benefit recipients. For medicines not felt to be essential, con-
sumption in the two groups fell by 15.14 and 22.39 percent. During the period of obser-
vation the frequency of incidents connected with reduced medicine consumption rose 
among older people from 5.8 per 10,000 person-months before introduction of the co-
payments to 12.6, and among welfare benefit recipients from 14.2 to 27.6 per 10,000 
person-months. The number of acute medical emergencies caused by inadequate medi-
                                                  
227  Federmann et al. 2001: 1735; White et al. 2002: 189f; Jackevicius et al. 2002: 466; Schultz et 
al. 2005: 309; Soumerai et al. 2006: 1831f. 
228  White et al. 2002: 189f; Jackevicius et al. 2002: 466; Schultz et al. 2005: 309; Soumerai et al. 
2006: 1831f 
229  Tamblyn et al. 2001: 426f; Appleton 2002: 496; Goldman et al. 2006a: 27; Atella et al. 2006: 
888ff. Patients with diabetes mellitus, coronary or ischaemic heart disease (esp. after myo-
cardial infarction), arteriosclerosis or other vascular diseases. 
230  Medicare beneficiaries with three or more chronic health conditions lacking drug coverage 
purchased almost 25 percent fewer prescriptions than did those with coverage; however, 
the uncovered paid on average US$375  more out of pocket (Poisal/Murray 2001: 82f). A gen-
der gap was also observed, because uncovered males used about 40 percent fewer prescrip-
tions than males with drug coverage, while usage was only 27 percent lower for uncovered 
than for covered females. With regard to the burden of out-of-pocket payments, this means 
that males without coverage spend only around 47 percent in total on their medications 
compared with covered males, while non-covered females were spending a total of 60 per-
cent of the drug expenditure of their counterparts with drug coverage (ibid.: 79). 
231  Poisal/Chulis 2000: 251f, 254f; Poisal/Murray 2001: 79f; Steinmann et al. 2001: 797. 
232  Currie/Nielson 1999: 48, 51. 
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cation rose from 8.5 to 19.9 per 10,000 person-months among older people and from 
69.6 to 123.8 among welfare benefit recipients.233 
Another study conducted in Quebec about the prescription of essential heart medi-
cines (beta-blockers, ACE inhibitors and lipid-lowering drugs) after acute myocardial 
infarction showed that co-payment terms had no effect on medicine-taking behaviour 
and complication rates in the first thirty days after discharge from hospital.234 But over 
time drug co-payments plainly do have negative effects, as demonstrated by a study of 
privately insured employees in the United States. Increasing the drug co-payment by 
one dollar led to a $9.71 fall in drug spending, a $6.46 fall in outpatient treatment costs, 
a $3.39 fall in hospital costs and a $20.39 fall in total health spending. However, in the 
second year after the increase in co-payments the costs for inpatient and outpatient 
treatment rose by $10.71 and $13.03 respectively and overall spending by $22.85, while 
drug spending fell by $8.35.235 Increasing drug co-payments achieved smaller effects in 
employer-funded health insurance plans in the United States, which is probably at least 
partly because people with a regular income will regard an increase in the out-of-
pocket payment from $5 to $10 or $8 to $15 as less dramatic than poorer citizens or 
pensioners. In any case, with this group the insurers’ spending on drugs fell by only 
approximately 4 percent.236 
From 1970 to 1998 the absolute volume of direct co-payments in the United States 
rose from $24.9 billion to $199.5 billion, while their share of overall spending certainly 
halved, from 34.02 to 17.36 percent, largely as a consequence of the extension of public 
insurance programmes.237 By the end of the 1990s US citizens were paying 15.6 percent 
of medical expenses out of their own pockets.238 Since the beginning of the twenty-first 
century out-of-pocket payments for health care have grown much more quickly, espe-
cially with vertical integration insurance plans. Thus in Preferred Provider Organisa-
tions (PPO) between 2000 and 2003 the deductibles rose by 57 percent for in-network 
providers and 65 percent for out-of-network providers, while drug co-payments in-
creased by 46 percent for preferred products and 71 percent for other medicines.239 It is 
nothing new for US employers to attempt to include increasing out-of-pocket payments 
in their private insurance policies, whether by means of flat-rate or tiered co-
                                                  
233  Tamblyn et al. 2001: 425f. One should also mention in this context further research and 
calculations from the Franco-Canadian province showing that the price elasticity usually 
presumed as underlying health policy decisions is often overestimated (Contoyannis 2005: 
919f). 
234  Pilote et al. 2002: 249f. 
235  Gaynor et al. 2005a: 23ff and 2005b: 29ff. Sometimes comparative calculations are carried 
out, including the potentially achievable prolongation of life expectancy as a consequence of 
secondary and tertiary care. In this context, the focus is on insurance expenditures, which 
increase in line with the longer lifetimes and consequently longer treatment periods for all 
beneficiaries whose expenditures exceed the contributions collected (Shang 2005: 69). In 
these matters, however, strict economic rationality clashes with basic ethical considerations 
and the core function of health care and health care financing. 
236  Joyce et al. 2002: 1738. 
237  Levit et al. 1999: 131. 
238  Ibid.: 129. 
239  Garber 2004: 292f 
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payments, co-insurance or deductibles.240 While the average premium of an American 
employee rose 175 percent between 1999 and 2005 from $129 to $226, deductibles in-
creased by 467 percent during the same period from $49 to $229, and some firms began 
offering insurance policies with annual deductibles of $1,000 to $5,000.241 
The uncontested aim of this policy is for companies to reduce or at least stabilise 
the burden of contributions to health insurance plans acquired for their employees.242 
The shift from paying in advance to point-of-use affects lower-income groups more 
than the better-off and especially burdens the chronically ill with high and sometimes 
unaffordable health costs.243 At the system level it is should be noted that employers’ 
efforts to stabilise contributions leads them to neglect the supplier side and focus on 
patient behaviour.244 In the United States a debate is now beginning about a possible 
deterioration in the quality of care, especially for the chronically ill, through the im-
plementation of consumer-directed health care with high deductibles.245 Recent studies 
also provide evidence that the cost savings intended by employers through shifting 
medicine costs to employees with chronic conditions do not pay off at all. It was found 
that reduced medication adherence related to co-payments had direct effects on the 
frequency and duration of incapacity to work among employees with rheumatoid ar-
thritis.246 
In Israel, too, there are financial barriers to access to health care. In a survey by the 
Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute, 5 percent of respondents said in 2001 that they had 
done without prescribed treatments during the previous year, and two years later the 
figure was 6 percent. People on low incomes waived medical treatment most frequently: 
10 percent stopped taking medicines, while half that number did without recommended 
appointments with specialists. Ignorance of co-payment limits plainly exacerbated the 
situation, because poorer citizens were more likely to be unaware of them (81 percent 
compared with the average of 73 percent) and spent more than one percent of their 
income on cost-sharing.247 
                                                  
240  Freiman 1984: 90; Claxton et al. 2004: 88f; Claxton et al. 2005: 76f, 91ff; Weinick et al. 2005: 
504; Lee/Hoo 2006: w546; McDevitt et al. 2007: 213f. 
241  Blumenthal 2006b: 196; Buntin et al. 2006: w517 
242  Colombo/Taray 2001: 38; Katz 2001; P. Ginsburg 2002: 7; Trude et al. 2002: 66, 74; Fuchs 
2002: 1822; J. Finkelstein 2004; Prada et al. 2004: 41; Crawford et al. 2004: 3. 
243  P. Ginsburg 2002: 7; Trude et al. 2002: 66, 70f, 74; Trude 2003; Goodman 2006: w541; McDe-
vitt et al. 2007: 215f. 
Between 1977 and 1987, the number of employer-financed health insurance policies with 
cost sharing had increased from 85 percent to 95 percent; a similar increase was observed 
for policies with a minimum 20 percent co-payment (Rice/Thorpe 1993: 23). Interestingly, 
some surveys reveal a significantly higher share of persons with chronic diseases having 
insurance policies with high absolute co-payments compared to those with relatively low 
out-of-pocket payments (Lee/Zapert 2005: 1204); this might suggest a problem of adverse 
selection (Buntin et al. 2006: W 517f), but at the same time it shows the potential relevance 
of the risk of patients discontinuing or reducing medical treatment because of the costs. 
244  J. Finkelstein 2004; cf. also Ross 2006: w552f. 
245  Lee/Zapert 2005: 1203f; Buntin et al. 2006: W519f; Yegian 2006: W 534f. 
246  Jinnett et al. 2007: 6f. 
247  Gross et al. 2005: 8. 
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In the industrialised countries of Western Europe user charges come largely in the 
form of co-payments for health care, and largely affect medicines and selected other 
health services.248 Additionally, cost-sharing is required for hospital treatment for ex-
ample in Germany and France, while inpatient treatment in the Netherlands is free of 
co-payments.249  
A meta-analysis of three studies from Australia, Canada and the United States found 
that out-of-pocket payments amounting to 25–30 percent of treatment costs reduced 
demand for medical services by 25–28 percent.250 But such conclusions must always be 
treated with caution and are certainly difficult to transfer from one country or health 
system to another. Also, that kind of global analysis does not allow distinctions to be 
made between different age, risk and social groups. Theoretical economic calculations 
from Australia assume that doubling co-payments from $A2.50 to $A5 would cause a 20 
percent fall in the medicine consumption of pensioners, while an increase to $A6 would 
cause a 34 percent fall.251 Despite the relatively large percentage increase, under Aus-
tralian income conditions such prices certainly fall into the category of “minor co-
payments” that politicians are willing to impose in other countries too, yet the impact is 
enormous.252 
Since co-payments have the strongest and longest-lasting effect on medicines for 
treating cardiovascular conditions and hypertension and on psychotropic drugs, which 
patients usually have to take long-term,253 we can assume that even cost-sharing on a 
relatively small scale will have relevant consequences for the health of a population and 
cause negative repercussions on overall health spending.254 One piece of evidence for 
this is the observation that among low-income Medicaid members suffering from 
schizophrenia, limiting reimbursable psychotropic drugs to three prescriptions per 
month led to a 15 to 49 percent reduction in the consumption of all relevant kinds of 
antipsychotic, antidepressant and anxiolytic medication. In the subsequent period a 
clear increase in the use of psychiatric emergency facilities and daycare institutions 
was observed, which as well as plainly reflecting more suffering of the affected persons 
also increased overall spending for this group of patients.255 Per capita expenditure on 
                                                  
248  Carrin/Hanvoravongchai 2003: 6; Barry et al. 2004: 191. 
249  Henke/Schreyögg 2004: 64, 67f. 
250  Richardson 1991: 9ff. 
251  Richardson 1991: 49. 
252  For publicly registered drugs meeting well-defined efficacy, safety, and quality standards, 
patients in Australia have to pay fixed co-payments of approximately US$11.80 per item; so 
called concession patients (aged, disabled, unemployed, or students, for example) pay a fixed 
amount of US$1.90 per drug item (Birkett et al. 2004: 105f). 
253  Reeder/Nelson 1985: 399f; cf. on this point Chapters 9 and 10. 
254  This suggests indirectly that Medicaid beneficiaries with additional insurance coverage for 
dialysis, the so-called Medicaid end-stage-renal-disease (ESRD) program paying even for 
immunosuppressant drugs and erythropoietin, also more frequently use antihypertensives, 
cardiovascular and other drugs prescribed by treating physicians and covered by the public 
health insurance scheme (Shih 1999: 52f). Cf. also Gaynor et al. 2005a: 23). 
255  It is relatively difficult to evaluate the consequences and follow-up costs of the reduced 
utilisation of medications for children with attention deficit and hyperactivity syndrome. 
Certainly, increased drug co-payments are not without impacts for the group of affected 
children, despite the undeniable psychological stress of the latter and their social environ-
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psychiatric outpatient treatment following the introduction of the restriction on pre-
scriptions exceeded the savings achieved by a factor of more than seventeen, even 
given that many indirect costs were not even included in this calculation.256 
In Europe there are generally monthly or yearly upper limits for drug co-payments, 
andsometimes tiered out-of-pocket spending,257 which have two main aims.258 On the 
one hand they potentially strengthen the negotiating position of the state or insurers 
vis-à-vis the pharmaceuticals manufacturers, promote price competition especially 
among brand products but also with and among generics,259 and can lead to a reduction 
in overall drug spending. On the other, they might tend to shift consumption towards 
cheaper products and thus tend to reduce drug prices.260 
However, tiered drug co-payments bring with them a series of implementation 
problems261 and their effects are not uniform262 so it ultimately remains uncertain 
whether they actually lead to changes in patients’ health-related behaviour. Although 
there is evidence that they could represent an effective regulating instrument for espe-
cially expensive medicines whose marginal utility is questionable,263 the findings and 
                                                                                                                                                  
ment.  In employer-based managed care polices contracting large managed-care organisa-
tions, the implementation of three-tiered and generally rising levels of cost sharing (US$0 
per prescription for generics, US$15 for preferred brand products and US$30 for other than 
preferred brand drugs), the predicted monthly probability of using ADHD medication showed 
a 17 percent decrease compared to the control group and induced a substantial shift of 
ADHD treatment costs onto households (Huskamp et al. 2005: 438f). 
256  Soumerai et al. 1994: 652ff. 
257  Huskamp et al. 2000: 12f, 17f; Jemiai et al 2002: 2; Barry et al. 2004: 191; Mossialos/Oliver 
2005: 295; cf. also Böcken et al. 2000: 126. 
258  Huskamp et al. 2003a: 150. 
259  Frank 2001: 117f, 121, 126; Huskamp et al. 2003a: 150f; Greß et al. 2005: 10f. 
260  Hong/Shepherd 1999: 528f; Huskamp et al. 2000: 20; Motheral/Fairman 2001: 1301f; Lex-
chin/Grootendorst 2002: 22f; Joyce et al. 2002: 1737f; Esposito 2002: 13; Rector et al. 2003: 
401f; Busse/Schlette 2004: 59f; Briesacher et al. 2004: 1681f; Provost 2004: 14; Newhouse 
2004a: 90; de Wolf et al. 2005: 369. Estimates for Germany also assume potential savings of 
approximately €1.5 billion through the systematic utilisation of generics (Ratiopharm 2005). 
However, the cutback of the market segment suitable for generics and the decline of the 
price differences compared to branded products suggest that the potential efficiency gains 
will stay below the expected level (Nink/Schröder 2004, S 156). 
261  Huskamp et al. 2000: 15ff. 
262  Cf. e.g. Thomas/Mann 1998, S, 1830; Schneeweiss et al. 1998: 258f; Schneeweiss et al. 2002a: 
826ff; Schneeweiss et al. 2002b: 523ff. 
263  Cf. Joyce et al. 2002: 1737f; Fairman et al. 2003: 3157f; de Wolf et al. 2005: 371; Lee/Hoo 
2006: w545. For preventing economically induced discrimination against worse-off patients 
with regard to medical therapy and secondary prevention in times of “consumer-driven” 
health care in private health insurance markets like the US, experts are increasingly de-
manding that patient cost sharing – mainly for pharmaceutical therapies – should be de-
fined according to their expected clinical as well as economic effectiveness (Goldman et al. 
2006a: 27; Sipkoff 2004: 22; Lee/Hoo 2006: W545; Taira et al- 2006: 681f). Private health in-
surance companies in the US control beneficiaries’ drug utilisation applying different forms 
of so called formulary lists or formularies (Frank 2001: 120f). These lists vary substantially 
from one scheme to the other. In principle, three different types can be distinguished 
(Motheral/Fairman 2001: 1293f; Huskamp et al. 2003a: 150f; Gabel et al. 2002: 151; cf. also 
Greß et al. 2005: 42): Open formularies list all medications defined as preferred drugs by the 
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conclusions from North America concerning the overall effect on the health status of 
the population are still quite inconsistent.264 Depending on the structure of the health 
system and the available data, it can be exceptionally difficult to isolate the effects of 
price controls for medicines, as we have seen in the case of drug price controls in Ger-
many.265 Nor is switching between supposedly equivalent preparations always unprob-
                                                                                                                                                  
particular health insurance providers, whereas this does not imply any obligation for pro-
viders to restrict prescriptions exclusively to these products. Closed formularies are posi-
tive lists in the strict sense of the meaning because they specifically define the prescription 
drugs covered. One or several specific medicines are assigned to each therapeutic area of 
application, and within these drug classes medicines are registered differently as generics 
and branded products. Incentive formularies, also referred to as three-tier formularies, in-
clude closed lists as well, but for certain indications they permit a choice between compara-
ble medicines, namely a brand name product, a non-preferred brand and a generic. Benefi-
ciaries have to pay different amounts or different percentages of the cost out of pocket. Co-
payment is highest for those branded products that are sold under their brand name and 
me-too drugs are available for. Out-of-pocket charges are second highest for branded medi-
cines without a less expensive generic, and lowest cost sharing is due for generics (Gabel et 
al. 2002b: 147; cf. Greß et al. 2005: 42). As completely closed formularies create competition-
related problems especially for private health insurance companies, mix formularies with 
partly open and partly closed areas are increasingly prevailing. These areas refer to dug 
classes and have been defined mainly for high utilisation medicines with empirical evi-
dence of therapeutic effectiveness, e.g. ACE inhibitors, ß and α blockers, statin type lipid 
lowering agents (HMG CoA reductase-inhibitors), H2-blockers, and proton pump inhibitors. 
For prescriptions of drugs included in these and other classes patients have to pay three-
tiered amounts or shares out of pocket (Schneeweiss et al. 2002a: 824ff; Huskamp et al. 
2003a: 151; Huskamp et al. 2003b: 2225, 2227f; cf. Greß et al. 2005: 42). In the last years 
mainly incentive pricing has been established requiring lower co-payments for generics or 
cheap branded products, but significantly higher out-of-pocket payments for expensive and 
patented brand drugs (Provost 2004: 16). Since formularies are linked to co-payments, these 
lists itemise the drugs belonging to a substance group in principal according to cost-
effectiveness criteria. Patients requiring off-formulary medicines, that means other prod-
ucts of a therapeutic class unregistered in the insurer’s drug list, (s)he has to pay the full 
price out of pocket (Huskamp et al. 2000: 13ff; Greß et al. 2005: 42f). As a consequence of 
these increasingly established health insurance conditions in the US, the average co-
payment for brand-name drugs belonging to therapeutic classes that include a generic 
equivalent rose only between 2001 and 2002 from US$16 to US$26. At the same time, aver-
age cost sharing for me-too products increased just from US$8 to US$9. Altogether, during 
this period, out-of-pocket payment rose by 11 percent in smaller companies and by as much 
as 60 percent in larger enterprises (Gabel et al. 2002b: 146f). This is because in smaller com-
panies three-tiered co-payments are relatively more expensive in terms of bureaucratic 
and, thus, financial costs; hence enterprises with fewer employees are easily overburdened 
by the necessary bureaucratic tasks (Trude/Grossman 2004: 3). 
264  Gibson et al. 2005b: 738f. 
265  Schneeweiss et al. 1998: 256ff. 
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lematic;266 this leads to increasing adherence problems among patients267 and at least in 
the transition phase to increased use of other medical services.268 
There are fundamental differences between health policy interests – especially 
where they are strongly influenced by economic targets – and clinical considerations. 
Political decisions are usually based on the expected net impact of governance effects, 
which allows no detailed assessment of the impact on subgroups. Primarily clinical con-
siderations are potentially subject to the problem of distortion through selection, losses 
through mortality and unexpected selection mechanisms.269 Regardless of such difficul-
ties, the debate on the application of co-payments for hierarchically desired steering of 
the service provider utilisation is currently gaining in importance in Europe. Thus pa-
tients in Denmark, France and – since the Health Modernisation Act – in Germany too 
are required to pay higher or additional co-payments when they visit specialists’ prac-
tices on their own initiative without a referral.270 This all occurs without any reliable 
proof that patients’ demand for medicines is at all as insatiable as the economic theory 
assumes for (almost) free goods.271 
 
11 Effects on Care of High-risk Patients 
In all the industrialised countries – and elsewhere – the number of chronic diseases and 
their importance is rising steadily, transforming healthcare requirements and the chal-
lenges faced by the health system. Unlike acute illnesses, chronic conditions require 
long-term, often life-long medication. Here long-term medication is crucial for the 
course of the illness, and adequate pharmacological therapy is in the long term decisive 
both for the individual’s health status and for the individually incurred costs.272 Inade-
quate treatment with essential medications such as beta-blockers and or lipid-lowering 
drugs after myocardial infarction or for other vascular problems leads to measurable 
undesired outcomes, and causes high avoidable costs, especially compared with rela-
tively inexpensive drug therapy.273 Conspicuous in this connection is the finding of an 
Australian study on the burden of co-payments for rheumatism patients, which found 
that female patients had higher out-of-pocket payments than male patients, and that 
these increased above all with the length of illness.274 
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270  Cf. Ettelt et al. 2006: 6. 
271  Kleinke 2004b: 39f. 
272  Gaynor et al. 2005a: 23f. 
273  Soumerai et al. 1997: 118; Soumerai et al. 2006: 1831f; at least for ß-blockers this effect 
seems to depend on the price because it is less pronounced for lower-cost medicines 
(Schneeweiss et al. 2007). 
274  Lapsley et al. 2002: 820. 
  45 
A meta-analysis of fifty-nine studies on the effects of drug co-payments on medi-
cine-taking, health status and medical and hospital costs came to the conclusion that 
drug co-payments affected low-income patients most, while they had only minor effects 
on economically active younger and better-off citizens.275 The most vulnerable groups, 
precisely, restricted their consumption of essential and non-essential medicines.276 This 
seems to become especially relevant when patients reach possible coverage ceilings, 
which occurs especially in the case of capped drug coverage. Because of their incom-
plete health insurance coverage, older Americans insured through Medicare have to 
raise relatively high co-payments and especially to pay for outpatient medications out 
of their own pocket.277 When they have used up their annual prescription cap they 
switch to various cost-cutting strategies, through which they sometimes expose them-
selves to increased risk of illness and death.278 This effect is plainly dependent on the 
total annual burden of drug co-payments and is less strong in insurance contracts with 
relatively high coverage.279 
Even patients whose dramatic experiences could lead one to assume greater insight 
into the necessity of therapy economise on their medications. A new multi-centred 
study from the United States found that 12 percent of heart attack patients completely 
ceased the standard drug therapy (ASS, beta-blocker plus statin-type lipid-lowering 
drug) in the very first month after discharge from acute hospital treatment, and an-
other almost 18 percent stopped taking at least one of the drugs. Poorer, less educated 
and older patients were especially affected.280 One-year mortality among those who 
stopped all their drugs was five times higher than among those patients who were still 
taking their triple therapy after one month (survival rate 85.5 percent compared with 
97.7 percent).281 
Health insurance data from the United States show that diabetics, like patients with 
coronary heart disease, tend to take their medication incompletely or not at all even 
though there has been a noticeable improvement in care and treatment options for pa-
tients with diabetes mellitus in industrialised countries over the past twenty-five years, 
and this has been reflected in the values for example for HbA1c, blood pressure and lipid 
levels.282 Incomplete or absent antidiabetic therapy leads not only to a worsening of 
these indicators, but also significantly increases the risk of hospital admission and 
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mortality.283 Co-payments for blood glucose test strips and comparable means for type 2 
diabetics to test their own blood sugar may reduce – as intended – the overuse of such 
diagnostic services, but they also reduce the application of indicated measures,284 
whereby this effect is again stronger among lower-income patients than in higher-
income groups.285 
Another recent US study also finds comparable results for other forms of therapy 
and groups of medicines. Increasing the co-payment for statin-type lipid-lowering 
drugs286 from $10 to $20 depending on the patient’s risk profile led to a reduction of 6 
to 10 percentage points in full compliance. Taking lipid-lowering drugs as prescribed 
not only significantly reduces the hospitalisation rate of high-risk patients287 in com-
parison with those who stop therapy (357 fewer hospital admissions per 1,000), but also 
considerably in comparison with incomplete compliance (168 fewer hospital admissions 
per 1,000). On the other hand, among lower-risk patients the reduction in hospital ad-
missions was only marginal (with higher compliance by 42 and with moderate adher-
ance by 21 per 1,000). It would be obvious to apply differentiated cost sharing depend-
ing on the patient’s risk profile, so that only those with a small health risk or a mar-
ginal indication for lipid-lowering drugs would have to pay anything out of their own 
pocket for medicines. Co-payment-free access to cholesterol-lowering medications for 
high-risk patients would reduce the annual number of emergency treatments by 31,411 
and the number of hospital admissions by 79,837, resulting in overall savings in health 
spending of more than one billion dollars.288 
In the field of psychiatry, which largely deals with long-term conditions, it has long 
been known that short-term savings through drug co-payments often have the opposite 
effect in the end.289 A study from Berlin published more than forty years ago, in 1965, 
shows that 85 percent of the patients of the Zentralinstitut für Psychogene Störungen 
who had received psychoanalysis or psychoanalytical psychotherapy experienced a 
clinical improvement, while the frequency of hospital admission also fell during the 
five-year observation period.290 A comprehensive meta-analysis of twenty-five studies 
on the effect of psychosomatic therapies on psychiatric patients and addicts found evi-
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dence of a reduction in the subsequent use of medical services by an average of 20 per-
cent.291 Interestingly, psychotherapeutic treatment seems to have a stronger effect on 
demand for hospital treatment than on outpatient services, with the effect incidentally 
being stronger among older patients.292 In view of the considerably higher costs of hos-
pital treatment this would suggest a relevant potential for savings through demand-
driven access to psychiatric therapy services.293 
In this connection it is interesting to consider an American study of the behaviour 
of older citizens suffering from schizophrenia, whose income is still above the limit for 
Medicaid and are therefore only insured under Medicare on grounds of age. This group 
was between 25 and 45 percent less likely to have used rehabilitation services, individ-
ual therapies with non-psychiatrist providers and case-management than the control 
group who were covered by both Medicare and Medicaid. Analysis of data from the 
Schizophrenia Care and Assessment Program (SCAP) showed no difference between the 
two groups in terms of access to second-generation antipsychotics or regular contact 
with a psychiatrist. This means that the higher out-of-pocket payments for those in-
sured only with Medicare (or the lack of opportunity to obtain reimbursement of the 
required co-payments) represent a decisive cause for the differences in treatment.294 
The direct effect on medication even of “minor co-payments” is also demonstrated 
by an Italian study published at the end of 2006, which examined the medicine-taking 
behaviour of patients with hypertension and the consequences for health in the context 
of two consecutive reforms. Health reforms introduced in quick succession at the be-
ginning of this decade created a kind of “natural experiment” in Italy: after first tempo-
rarily abolishing drug co-payments of approximately €1.50 per prescription on 1 Janu-
ary 2001, the number of drugs per prescription was reduced from six to three on 30 
September the same year; on 1 March 2002 the Italian government reintroduced drug 
co-payments at €1 per prescription. After the suspension of prescription charges an 
improvement in compliance among patients with hypertension was found within just 
three months. This effect was particularly strong among those individuals who had 
been taking reduced doses. Accordingly adherence worsened again during the same 
timeframe when the €1 prescription charge was reintroduced, although because the 
amount was smaller, the effect was smaller than fifteen months previously. Co-
payments and compliance had measurable effects on hospitalisation rates and mortal-
ity. After the suspension of drug co-payments the number of hospital admissions of 
hypertensive patients with low compliance fell by 0.8 percentage points (from 7.9 to 7.0 
percent) while the figure for those with good compliance remained unchanged. The ef-
fect on mortality was also weaker among low-compliants, falling by 0.2 percentage 
points (from 3,4 to 3,2 %). After reintroduction of the prescription charge both indica-
tors rose again.295 
Of course part of the responsibility lies with the practitioners, who fail to properly 
explain to their patients the newly prescribed medicines, how long they should be taken 
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and what the potential undesired effects might be.296 Again and again in health systems 
that should in principle guarantee universal coverage and a high degree of equity – 
whether social health insurance or tax-funded – we find evidence of inadequate pre-
scription of evidence-based medication leading to general and socially inequitable un-
derprovision.297 The healthcare system undeniably bears a certain positive responsibil-
ity for the country’s citizens and in particular for its patients.298 But financial burdens 
also always play an important role in the often bemoaned poor compliance of the 
chronically sick.299 This is clearly demonstrated by a recent study by the non-profit In-
tegrated Benefit Institute (IBI) in San Francisco, which investigated the medicine-taking 
behaviour of employees with rheumatoid arthritis under different health insurance 
conditions. A clear substance-dependent relationship between co-payment and compli-
ance was found: both purely pain-relieving and anti-rheumatic medicines demonstrated 
a clear price elasticity dependent on the level of co-payment, which was in fact stronger 
for symptom-relieving medicines. Increasing the co-payment by $20 led the acquisition 
of anti-rheumatic medicines to fall by 35 percent and pain-relieving medicines by 84 
percent.300 
In mid-2007 the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) published a meta-
analysis of studies on the effects of drug co-payments. The analysis covered 132 Eng-
lish-language PubMed articles examining the connection between cost-containing 
measures through drug prescription limits and/or co-payments and the outcome factors 
of medicine consumption, use of non-drug medical services, health spending and con-
sequences for health. It was consistently found that making patients share drug costs 
leads to a reduction in medication rates, poorer adherence and more frequent cessation 
of therapy. Per 10 percent increase in cost-sharing drug spending fell by 2 to 6 percent 
(depending on the type of medicine and the patient’s circumstances), with the decrease 
being the same where reimbursement or number of prescriptions was capped as with 
direct patient cost-sharing. With certain chronic conditions such as heart failure, lipid 
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metabolic disorders, diabetes mellitus, schizophrenia and probably also for bronchial 
asthma an increase in drug co-payments leads to increased use of other medical ser-
vices such as consulting practitioners and hospital admission. From the health service 
research perspective, the authors conclude, cost coverage for medicines is a decisive 
factor for improving treatment quality and adherence. Drug co-payments may lead to 
reduced compliance, but the medium- and long-term consequences for the health of 
those affected are to date unclear.301 
 
12 Effects on Prevention and Health Promotion 
Especially in the context of current health policy debates and initiatives to strengthen 
prevention and health promotion, the effects of cost-sharing on the consumption of 
preventive and promotive services gain obviously in importance. As is the case with 
other medical and pharmaceutical services, co-payments act generally as a deterrent to 
use of preventive services, too.302 This is confirmed by the observation that the use of 
check-ups and screening rises after they are exempted from co-payments303 and that 
including such preventive services in the health insurance coverage package increases 
their use.304 
Experts and decision-makers often underestimate the negative impact on health 
status when prevention is discouraged by co-payments. In the RAND study the period of 
observation was restricted to five years and participants over 65 were excluded.305 But 
the effects of underprovision – especially of preventive measures – only reveal them-
selves after a latency period of many years and will thus probably have largely escaped 
the attention of the RAND researchers.306 Even with pathological values, certain meas-
ured health parameters such as blood pressure have no subjectively discernible health 
repercussions for a long period of time, and the consequences only become apparent 
after many years.307 
Of course the immediate impact of cost-sharing on take-up of preventive measures 
is more easily and quickly measured than complex long-term effects. Alongside the 
direct effects of co-payments for preventive services, the prevention-related conse-
quences of co-payments for other health services and possible overlap effects must be 
considered. Use of preventive services is reduced not only by the direct costs involved, 
but also by all forms of co-payment for contact with physicians in situations where 
preventive services are implicitly performed.308 Matters become yet more complicated 
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where preventive measures are basically free of co-payments, but practitioners demand 
patient payments for other services. Experience from Germany since the introduction 
of the practice fee reveals a considerable potential for misuse on the part of service 
providers, aided by general ignorance on the part of patients and further confused by 
the grey zone of “individual health services” for which patients are officially required to 
pay the full cost themselves.309 Apparently just not knowing about whether there will 
be cost-sharing, and uncertainty about the financial burden, plainly keeps at least mar-
ginal groups from using screening programmes such as mammograms or Pap smears.310 
In this context the findings of a study thirty years ago in California are worth re-
visiting. It was found that the introduction of a practice fee of one dollar per contact – 
generally regarded as “marginal” – noticeably reduced family physician visits by poorer 
patients receiving benefits under California’s MediCal welfare programme. Some of the 
affected patients had to be admitted to hospital a few months later with conditions that 
would have been avoidable if they had consulted a practitioner in time.311 In direct con-
nection with prevention and screening services, a study of the utilisation of four pre-
ventive measure (mammograms, Pap smears, blood pressure screening and preventive 
consultations) among more than ten thousand employees in the western United States 
showed that cost-sharing had significant negative indirect effects on the number of 
preventive consultations, Pap smears and mammograms, while the effect on blood pres-
sure screening was inconsistent.312 
Efforts to deal with the growing global problem of obesity have already brought 
forth proposals to encourage people to reduce their weight through direct cost-
sharing.313 The idea of “self-inflicted” illnesses may be ideally suited for populist 
speechmaking and political rabble-rousing; and associated sanctioning mechanisms 
nearly made it into Germany’s Statutory Health Insurance Competition Strengthening 
Act of 2006. But as long as social and environmental factors have considerably greater 
measurable impact on health (see note 86), a strategy of punishing individuals is abso-
lutely lacking any serious basis. 
One important field of prevention is dental care, where the loss of tooth substance 
as a consequence of caries and inflammation of the gums is the central concern. Caries 
is a condition that affects almost everyone – about 99 percent of the population – and 
one whose non-treatment inevitably causes long-lasting and even progressing harm. 
Therapy cannot be carried out by a layperson, and the earliest possible professional 
treatment is the most effective means of avoiding considerable consequences and 
costs.314 The introduction of the practice fee for dentists reduced visits in the first two 
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quarters of 2004 by 13.1 and 8.2 percent. Thus, this co-payment arrangement must be 
regarded as potentially dangerous, because it makes early detection and treatment more 
difficult especially among the most vulnerable social groups.315 
A reduction in use of services due to patient co-payments was also found in me-
dium- and even long-term therapies in the field of tertiary prevention, whose cost-
benefit ratio for the target group of chronically ill high-intensity users becomes rela-
tively quickly positive in view of the costs that would otherwise be expected.316 A study 
produced at the RAND Graduate College investigated the connection between the level of 
co-payments and outpatient addiction therapies following treatment for alcohol poison-
ing among privately insured Americans. The number, length and intensity of follow-on 
therapy services used by alcoholics was inversely proportional to the level of co-
payments.317 Incidentally, all the investigated insurance contracts required relatively 
small co-payments of up to $30.318 So this study confirms that even relatively insignifi-
cant out-of-pocket payments can impact negatively on the take-up of clinically and epi-
demiologically worthwhile services. 
 
13 Effects on Emergency Care 
Even in the case of (objectively or subjectively) dramatic health problems, cost-sharing 
influences use and brings with it demonstrably unclear or even undesirable conse-
quences for both the affected and overall spending. Research from the 1980s demon-
strates reduced utilisation of medical outpatient facilities including emergency depart-
ments following the introduction of cost-sharing.319 But of course the symptoms of con-
ditions such as cardiac infarction are so grave that they usually lead to rapid presenta-
tion at a casualty department. A retrospective study from the state of Washington 
showed neither a relevant delay in treatment of privately insured patients with symp-
toms of acute myocardial infarction nor any correlation between the level of generally 
low co-payments and delay before treatment was started.320 Similarly, a retrospective 
analysis of hospital admissions found no significant difference between patients with 
cost-sharing and those with insurance plans covering full costs in the frequency of ad-
missions classified as unnecessary.321 
Especially in the United States “frivolous” admissions to casualty departments are 
regarded as a great waste of resources and there have been repeated attempts to limit 
their use by introducing charges.322 A retrospective study of client insurance data at the 
largest HMO insurance company, Kaiser Permanente, showed that after co-payments for 
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emergency treatment were raised from $5–10 to $25–35 the use of casualty depart-
ments fell by about 15 percent. A direct increase in undesired consequences of avoided 
emergency treatment could not be proven, but the overall numbers of deaths were too 
small to say anything about a possible effect on mortality rates.323 A comparable result 
was found by an analysis of casualty admissions and clinical complications of more than 
2,250,000 people with private health insurance and more than 260,000 with Medicare. 
Over the course of three years (1999–2001) emergency department visits fell as the 
level of co-payment increased. With out-of-pocket payments between $20 and $35, 12 
percent fewer people attended an emergency department, while with co-payments of 
$50–100 the figure was 23 percent fewer compared to cost-free access. The number of 
hospital admissions, intensive care treatments and deaths did not rise; instead the 
number of hospital admissions fell by 4 percent with lower co-payments and by 10 per-
cent with higher out-of-pocket payments.324 
Patients are often inadequately informed or even completely uninformed about the 
level of co-payments for emergency treatment. A survey of nearly seven hundred adult 
patients of a managed care system in the United States found that only one in three 
were aware of the level of co-payment for emergency care, whereas three quarters 
knew precisely the amounts involved for prescriptions or visiting a physician. More 
than half underestimated the out-of-pocket payment for emergency treatment by $20 
or more. Still, one in nine reported having delayed or avoided attending a casualty de-
partment because of the co-payments, and this behaviour correlated with the level of 
actual cost involved.325 
An earlier survey of a comparatively small group of people insured with a large 
HMO in the United States already showed that the great majority (82 percent) had to pay 
for emergency treatment out of their own pocket, but only one in two knew the level of 
cost-sharing. Almost one respondent in five reported having modified their behaviour 
during the preceding twelve months for that reason: 12 percent visited a different facil-
ity, 12 percent contacted a different provider by phone, 9 percent delayed going to 
casualty and 2 percent did not go at all. There was a clear correlation between the level 
of co-payment and changed take-up behaviour.326  
Another study shows that people with both low and high co-payments make less 
use of emergency care for less serious symptoms than those whose insurance covers 
the full cost. But high co-payments additionally reduced the likelihood of visiting a 
casualty department with serious symptoms. For the chronically ill, co-payments – re-
gardless of their scope – reduce the use of emergency facilities for both less and more 
serious symptoms. A study of 3,589 chronically ill persons in the United States showed 
that the use of medical services fell with both low and high co-payments, independently 
of the severity of the illness or health problem. Closer analysis also showed that those 
with high or low co-payments were less likely to have sought medical care for minor 
symptoms than patients whose costs were covered in full. For serious symptoms re-
duced take-up was observed only among those with high out-of-pocket payments, while 
behaviour was unchanged with low co-payments and with none. So perceptible co-
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payments in particular reduce take-up regardless of the severity of the symptoms. Dur-
ing the four-year observation period no effects were discernible on the health status of 
chronically ill patients.327 
As expected, similar effects can be achieved through high-deductible formularies. A 
quasi-experimental comparative study from the United States showed that changing 
from employer-funded insurance policies to policies with deductibles between $500 
and $2,000 for individuals and $1,000 to $4,000 for families reduced the use of emer-
gency care by about one tenth. Insurance data showed that people tended to avoid at-
tending a casualty department with less serious problems and especially for repeated 
treatments.328 During the brief observation period (on average not even one year) no 
adverse effects were observed such as increased hospital admissions or other complica-
tions.329 However the study allows no conclusions to be drawn about the respective 
level of cost-sharing and did not record delayed or non-attendance at emergency de-
partments under different health conditions.330 
The data presented so far show clearly that co-payments also act as a deterrent to 
attending casualty department and using emergency facilities. Especially where co-
payments are high, but not only in this case, the effect is maintained with serious 
symptoms. However, the consequences for the health of those affected have not been 
adequately researched. Depending on the circumstances and expectations completely 
different factors may be playing a role on the demand side. For example a survey at the 
Charité hospital in Berlin showed that although three quarters of patients visited the 
casualty department due to subjectively perceived medical needs, two thirds came 
without being referred by a practitioner because they were simply unaware of the al-
ternatives.331 
 
14 The Practice Fee in Germany 
The German Health Modernisation Act of 2003 introduced a co-payment of 10 percent of 
the costs on all medical services up to a maximum of €10; the minimum charge is €5, 
below that the patient pays the actual cost. A good two years after the Act came into 
force in Germany at the beginning of 2004 the first research findings arrived on the 
increase in existing co-payment modalities and especially the introduction of new ones. 
Mirroring the priorities of public and media attention, the research focused on the 
practice charge. Since 1 January 2004 every adult beneficiary of the statutory health 
insurance has had to pay a charge of €10 to visit the physician or dentist. The fee is due 
once per quarter, but is also charged for every additional consultation made without a 
referral from the practitioner visited first. Preventive measures such as immunisations, 
check-ups and screening are exempted.332  
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The most striking thing about the published research on the funding and steering 
effects of the practice charge is the conspicuous contradiction between studies. One 
study by the Wissenschaftliches Institut der AOK (WIdO) shows a clear social impact 
across the board at the end of the first quarter of 2004,333 while a joint analysis by the 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) and the Technical University (TU) in 
Berlin for the same period was unable to find income-dependent differences in ambula-
tory doctor visits.334 
The discrepancies can be partly explained by the different data sets on which the 
studies are based, as well as by incongruous approaches. But closer analysis also shows 
that premature analysis of very short-term effects may have influenced some of the 
findings. None of the research published up to the beginning of 2007 on the practice fee 
supplied sufficient valid and reliable data to be able to call into question the relevance 
for the German context of the many international research findings. 
All research on the practice charge in Germany published to date is based on the 
beneficiaries’ subjective assessment of their own health. The data sets from insurance 
funds and service providers (e.g. the Regional Associations of Statutory Health Insur-
ance Physicians) are not congruent and data protection laws make it very difficult to 
match service-use data to individual patients. Furthermore, all the assessments are 
based either on random samples or panel surveys, where marginalised social groups are 
fundamentally excluded. So the effects of the practice charge and other co-payment 
increases on homeless people, drug addicts and other groups with extremely high 
health risks are thus excluded from the research, which would mean a systematic un-
derestimate of the social impact.335 Another fundamental restriction of the validity of 
the German studies stems from the short observation period and the difficulties in es-
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335  According to unsystematically gathered observations by the personnel of the drug preven-
tion project Fixpunkt e.V. in Berlin / Germany, the initially pronounced undesired effects of 
user fees for physician visits seem to have attenuated in the meantime, at least for low-
income intravenous substance abusers enrolled in physician-based drug substitution pro-
grams. Regular visits to the substituting physician and spending in pharmacies quickly 
bring social welfare recipients (Hartz IV), in particular, to the exemption threshold fixed for 
the chronically ill at one percent of yearly income; due to the statutory health insurance 
funds’ practice of carrying forward lower exemption limits into the following year and ap-
proving these limits in advance, co-payments are no longer perceived as an unsurmount-
able barrier. This as well as other similar and familiarisation effects might have contributed 
to the finding that some surveys no longer show that low-income groups are reducing their 
number of doctor visits (cf. Zok 2005: 5). Thus, increased cost sharing could unexpectedly 
provide the clinically controversial methadone programme with additional positive effects 
(interviews with social workers employed by Fixpunkt in April 2006). 
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timating the medium-term and systemic effects of new or increased co-payments.336 
The effects of co-payment conditions on service utilisation certainly represent an in-
teresting approach, but neither the number of physician contacts nor the monetary 
value of avoided practice visits allow us to say anything about the meaningfulness of 
the steering achieved and still less about any savings that may have been made.337 
A study by WIdO examines possible changes in behaviour caused by the practice 
charge using a representative sample of three thousand people covered by statutory 
health insurance. The surveys were conducted shortly after the end of the first quarter 
in 2004 and 2005, in other words directly after the Health Modernisation Act came into 
force and one year later, and related to the three months preceding the interview. The 
second survey was conducted primarily to identify and exclude possible distortions oc-
curring in close association with the actual introduction of the practice fee (anticipatory 
behaviour, changeover difficulties, teething problems).338 The observation that three 
quarters of respondents reported having had medical treatment between January and 
March is conspicuous: the proportion is strikingly high in comparison with the popula-
tion as a whole.339 Analyses of office visits by gender and age show a higher proportion 
of women, and although service use increases steadily with age, the burden of cost-
sharing through the practice charge is expected to increase significantly less steeply 
than the burden of drug co-payments. 
                                                  
336  Quite a few examples of the discrepancy between short-, middle- and long-term effects are 
presented in the preceding Chapters 9 to 13; also cf. principally Hankin et al. 1980; Schnee-
weiss et al. 2002: 525; Schokkaert/van de Voorde 2005: S32; Gaynor et al. 2006; Shang 2005. 
337  Further details discussed in Chapter 8. 10-13 and 15.5-15.7. 
338  Zok 2005a: 2. 
339  The direct data evaluation exhibited an utilisation increase in early 2005 as compared to the 
first calendar quarter of 2004: Whilst immediately after the implementation of user charges 
for outpatient care 29.9 percent of the informants stated that they had not made any doctor 
visits, one year later the share had decreased to 25.8 percent (Zok 2005: 2). 
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Figure 1: Practice visits by age and sex (1st quarter 2005) 
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Source: Wissenschaftliches Institut der AOK.340 
Of the one quarter of respondents who had not been to the practitioner in the preceding 
quarter, only a minority said that the practice fee was the reason (6.5 percent in 2004 
and 6.6 percent in 2005). Beyond that nearly one fund member in ten who self-reported 
to be mildly ill and one in fourteen who reported to be seriously ill said that they had 
delayed consulting a physician or not gone at all because of the practice fee. The overall 
proportion of fund members who did not go to the practitioner or delayed their visit to 
the next quarter because of the practice fee was 9.4 percent in May 2005, rather less 
than the previous year (11.7 percent). Although the proportion who postponed consult-
ing a physician because of the practice fee fell in all age groups, the magnitude of the 
effect decreased with the age of the fund member. Whereas among the under-30s 14.7 
percent consulted a physician later or not at all, the proportion of over-65s was just 5.4 
percent. The practice fee is also more likely to lead women to avoid or delay consulting 
a practitioner (10.4 percent compared with 8.2 percent for men).341 
In the study, 50.2 percent of respondents said that they tried to complete consulta-
tions or treatments within a quarter if possible to save additional practice fees. But this 
observation does not automatically mean that it can be said that the practice fee has a 
“sensible” management effect, as long as it is impossible to judge whether possible 
premature use of services causes unnecessary spending, whether fitting the end of a 
course of treatment into a quarter is reasonable and, conversely, whether possibly de-
laying visiting a physician until a new quarter does not cause avoidable complications 
and deterioration with ensuing extra costs. 
                                                  
340  Zok 2005a: 3 
341  Zok 2005a: 5f. 
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One conspicuous finding of the WIdO study is that the observed social impact of the 
practice fee and other co-payments in the early phase following the implementation of 
the Health Modernisation Act was no longer observable just one year later.342 After the 
first quarter of 2004 almost one fund member in five with a monthly income under 
€1,000 (19.2 percent of that group) reported having postponed a consultation because of 
the practice fee, whereas this was the case with less than one in twelve fund members 
whose income was over €3,000. The socio-economic differences had evened out, 
whereby in particular the clear fall in the co-payment burden on the lowest-income 
groups and the unemployed could reflect an effective hardship arrangement. 
However, another study whose latest data cover the same period contradicts this 
finding. According to the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Gesundheitsmonitor the total num-
ber of consultations fell and the number of referrals shot up. Here it was found that 
members of the lowest income group were disproportionately likely to avoid a consul-
tation completely (37 percent compared with the average of 28 percent of all better-off 
respondents, whereas in the higher social strata this effect was less strong, and this 
group tended more to delay consultations.343 The greatest fall in consultations was in-
terestingly found among the under-35s, while older citizens were apparently less re-
sponsive to the introduction of the practice charge.344 
 
Table 3: 
Proportion of respondents who postponed, avoided or arranged additional consultations 
in response to the practice fee, by social class 
Social class Postponed Avoided  
completely 
Additional  No information 
Upper 27.76 14.20 24.82 33.22 
Upper middle 26.79 17.11 23.70 32.40 
Middle 25.63 18.79 28.17 27.41 
Lower middle 28.92 20.28 23.63 27.16 
Lower 29.44 22.25 26.28 22.03 
Source: Reiners and Schnee 2007 (N=6716, p=0.000) 
 
At the same time, the number of insurance fund members who sought no treatment at 
all from fund practitioners fell following introduction of the Health Modernisation Act 
compared with the respective period before the reform (spring 2003, well before the 
introduction of the practice fee, and spring 2005, twelve months afterwards),345 but re-
                                                  
342  Ibid. 
343  Reiners/Schnee 2007. 
344  Hesse/Schlette 2005: 5; this finding is consistent with former and recent observations 
monitored in the USA, showing that individuals in poorer health are less sensitive to price 
in the decision to seek health care (Wedig 1988: 161; Newhouse 1993; Remler/Atherly 2003: 
277f). 
345  Like other analysis of the Health Monitor (Gesundheitsmonitor), data on physician contacts 
reveal seasonal trends attributable to the date of the survey, because in spring beneficiaries 
tend to have better recollection of health problems during the winter semester while sur-
veys performed in autumn are more likely to recall events during summer time when ill-
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mained relatively constant between 2 and 3 percent.346 The overall trend for the consul-
tation ratio remained relatively constant, but rose slightly by 0.2 percent between 
spring 2003 and spring 2005. In relative terms, the effects of the practice fee tended to 
be stronger in the number of consultations with particular types of specialist and less 
with general practitioners. The more meaningful figure for total office visits on the 
other hand fell more clearly, by about 8 percent, between spring 2003 and spring 2005. 
According to another study, the biggest drop was seen by internists (-7 percent), fol-
lowed by family practitioners (-5 percent) and gynaecologists (-3 percent). However a 
downward trend was already observable here, because consultations fell by only 5 per-
cent between autumn 2003 and autumn 2004.347 
Analysis of office visits reveals a worrying trend. Especially people with a poor 
health status reduced their contacts between spring 2003 and spring 2005 from about 
twenty-three to sixteen visits per quarter, while the corresponding figure for people 
with outstanding health fell from about five to three. However, in the latter group a 
slight rise was observed between autumn 2004 and spring 2005, and only in the group 
with poor health was the fall more sustained.348 Unlike the DIW-TU study briefly de-
scribed below, the Gesundheitsmonitor found that all fund members had reduced their 
practice visits and that this effect was especially pronounced among persons with poor 
health. That would not only suggest that important consultations could be affected and 
relevant ensuing costs involved.349 This finding also shows that the government has not 
fully succeeded in its aim of preventing undesirable effects of co-payments through 
suitable hardship arrangements.350 It is namely also conspicuous that unemployed peo-
ple and single parents were especially likely to completely avoid or postpone a consul-
tation (21 and 18 percent of respondents respectively).351 
                                                                                                                                                  
ness and physician contacts are more infrequent. Data comparison of autumn 2003 or au-
tumn 2004 and spring 2004 or spring 2005, respectively, have likewise delivered interesting 
results, but the “purest” effect of the co-payment for ambulatory doctor visits can be ex-
pected from comparing the data for spring 2003 and spring 2005 (Gebhardt 2005: 14). 
346  Reiners/Schnee 2007. 
347  Gebhardt 2005: 15f. 
348  Gebhardt 2005: 20. 
349  Ibid.: 23f. 
350  Ibid.: 24. 
351  Ibid.: 27. 
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Figure 2: Use of outpatient services by income 
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 Source: Gebhardt 2005: 24 
Against the background of the moral hazard theory, it is astonishing in the Gesund-
heitsmonitor survey that above all people with a high number of consultations reduced 
their number of visits. In fact, among people with up to four consultations per year the 
number of contacts actually rose by up to 10 percent following the introduction of the 
practice charge. At the same time it was observed that the number of contacts fell above 
all among persons who visited a physician at least ten times per year. While the average 
frequency of practice contacts in this group in spring 2003 was 28.9 visits per person 
and quarter, the figure fell to 25.4 in spring 2004 and still further to 23.8 in spring 2005 
and 23.2 in spring 2006.352 Actually the practice fee cannot have any effect on moral 
hazard behaviour among the “high frequency users” so an increase in consultations 
would have been expected. Because they are very likely to visit a practice at least once 
every quarter and will thus have to pay the practice fee anyway – at least up to the ex-
emption limit – avoiding additional consultations within the quarter will not save them 
any costs. For people with a high number of consultations generally evenly distributed 
throughout the year due to chronic conditions, the practice charge offers no economic 
incentive to visit the practitioner less often. As utility-maximising homines oeconomici 
these people should be expected to maximise consultations in order to take full advan-
tage of the fee once paid.353 Here various other factors will surely be decisive, such as 
                                                  
352  Reiners/Schnee 2007. 
353  Gebhardt 2005: 17. 
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increases in other co-payments at the same time as the introduction of the practice 
charge, the ongoing debate about supposed overuse of the health service, general un-
certainty about the effects of the reform, and above all interference by effects of the 
almost simultaneous changes in payment arrangements for practice-based physicians 
and the introduction of practice budgets.354 
In any case the measured behaviour relativises the economic theory of rational de-
mand in the health sector and demonstrates that other factors play an important role 
and may relegate behaviour derived from economic theory to the background.355 Fur-
thermore it is questionable whether the described changes were really caused by the 
introduction of the practice fee. There is reason to believe that the changes in fre-
quency of consultations are more likely a consequence of modified behaviour by prac-
tice-based practitioners adapting to the almost simultaneous changes in payment and 
budgeting arrangements.356 This is probably also reflected in another effect observed 
following the changes brought about by the Health Modernisation Act. The number of 
consultations of practice-based specialists without a referral by a family physician or 
another specialist fell clearly after 2004. Previously only 55–59 percent of patients had 
obtained a referral from a general practitioner before visiting a specialist, but after the 
introduction of the practice fee that figure jumped to between 81 and 85 percent by 
2006. Habituation effects or falling referral rates have not been observed to date, so the 
practice charge does seem to strengthen the gatekeeper function of family physician.357 
A joint study by the DIW and the Technical Uniuversity of Berlin (TU) analysing the 
socio-economic panel (SOEP) found a significant fall in the average number of consulta-
tions by 0.24 (or 8.8 percent) between 2003 and 2004, whereby people with good or very 
good health visited the practitioner considerably less often than those with poorer 
health. The authors concluded that the practice fee primarily reduced unnecessary and 
multiple consultations, but led neither to a fall in medically necessary treatment nor to 
any disadvantage for members of lower social classes.358 However, this finding stands in 
clear contradiction to the results of international research outlined earlier in this study. 
Indeed, closer examination of the design reveals fundamental conceptual weak-
nesses in the DIW-TU study, in view of which the far-reaching conclusions would appear 
overstated. The early date of the survey suggests a low discrimitaive power of findings 
and above all precludes making general statements about the steering effects of co-
payments, which as a rule can only be assessed after a sufficient interval has passed.359 
Also the implied connection between general health status in year x and necessity of 
practice-based medical services in year x+1 is questionable from a clinical perspective. 
The assessment of the “necessity” of consultations derived from that statement seems 
too arbitrary to justify any conclusions about the effectiveness of the steering function 
                                                  
354  Cf. Reiners/Schnee 2007. 
355  Stuart/Stockton 1973: 353, footnote 2; cf. also Kern/Kupsch 2002: 15 and M. Ginsburg 2006: 
w537f. 
356  Cf. Zuckerman et al. 2004: 379ff; Rice/Labelle 1989: 597; Creese/Kutzin 1995: 10; Schroe-
der/Cantor 1991: 1099; Richardson 1991: 16; Reiners/Schnee 2007. 
357  Reiners/Schnee 2007. 
358  Grabka et al. 2005: 5ff. 
359  See footnote 336. 
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of co-payments,360 especially given that avoided treatment by no means automatically 
generates cost-saving effects, and can lead instead to considerably higher ensuing 
costs.361 And even if members of the lower class do not reduce their use of medical ser-
vices more strongly than the average of the population, that certainly does not exclude 
social disadvantage as claimed by the study.362 Increased use of services can be an ex-
pression of social disadvantage and a “normal” decrease can affect poorer citizens more 
strongly in relation to real need. 
A study published in 2005 investigated for the first time the effects of deductibles 
in statutory health insurance in Germany, as offered to voluntarily insured members of 
the Techniker Krankenkasse (TK) since the beginning of 2003.363 The experience of 
10,155 fund members in three regions shows that the number of visits to practice-
based practitioners by voluntarily insured fund members fell by 36.4 percent after the 
first twelve months, while visits by co-insured family members fell by 6.4 percent. This 
represented a cost reduction for insurance fund expenditure for outpatient services of 
€38–94 and an overall reduction in use of health services amounting to €137.364 How-
ever, this study covers only people who are voluntarily insured in the statutory health 
insurance system – in other words the better off – and of these only a tiny not neces-
sarily representative sample (0.015 percent of all statutory health insurance fund mem-
bers). As voluntary members they are partly outside the solidarity-based funding sys-
tem because their income is only counted up to the cut-off level (currently €3,562.50 
monthly).365 This is very important in relation to the postulated gains for fund members 
as a whole, which despite the asymmetric burden imposed by deductibles are supposed 
to lead to more “solidarity”.366 
Fundamentally the study assumes overuse of health services and ignores important 
empirical findings of health science research. Correspondingly the authors determine 
the cost-cutting and steering potential of “deductibles” without distinguishing between 
desirable and undesirable effects. But not going to the practitioner can result in consid-
erable costs that can more than cancel out the calculated savings.361 The short-term 
nature of the identified management effect is especially worrying, given that interna-
tional research identifies clear differences between the first year following the intro-
                                                  
360
  Alongside other studies, the RAND experiment had revealed that co-payments have a much 
stronger negative effect, especially on initial physician visits, by those in good to excellent 
health than people in bad health or with chronic conditions; only for follow-up doctor visits, 
healthy and ill individuals present a similar reduction of utilisation (Wedig 1988: 158ff; 
Newhouse 1993: 160ff). 
361  Chapters 10 to 13 provide several examples for this undesired co-payment effect that can be 
generally observed; Sections 15.6 and 15.7 summarise again the findings concerning this 
matter. The following citations should be highlighted at this point because of the sample 
size or the comprehensiveness of the approach: Soumerai et al. 1991, 1994 and 1997; Tam-
blyn et al. 2001; OECD 2004b: 18; Goldman et al. 2004, 2006; Chandra et al. 2007. 
362  Grabka et al. 2005: 5. 
363  By bearing an absolute cost-sharing amount of €300, beneficiaries of the “TK-Program 240” 
obtain a yearly contribution discount of €240 per year in which each outpatient physician 
visit accounts for €20. 
364  Felder/Werblow 2006: 65, 71. 
365  AOK-Mediendienst 2005. 
366  Cf. Pütz 2003: 39. 
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duction of cost-sharing and subsequent years.336 Rather than making a helpful contribu-
tion to scientific debate, publishing such research after (less than) one year calls its 
seriousness into question. 
 
15 Unresolved Problems 
The following summary provides an overview of the most important theoretical and 
practical contradictions of co-payment theory and the central findings about the effects 
of cost-sharing. This summary reiterates why the risks associated with out-of-pocket 
payment for health care often outweigh the expected benefits. 
15.1. Patient Behaviour not Operationalisable 
The one-sided concept of the homo oeconomicus can at best explain a small part of the 
behaviour of the “consumer in the health market”. The assumption that all insured per-
sons are 100 percent rational utility maximisers367 leaves out many real motives for 
behaviour.368 There is no proof that people in the “perfectly imperfect” health market 
behave fully or decisively in the way proposed by the endless formulae and figures 
from the economists’ ivory towers.369 With the practice charge in Germany for example, 
we find none of the free-riding effects that would confirm the idea of the individual 
economic rationality of statutory health insurance fund members.370 Similarly, studies 
from the United States from the early 1990s show that the effects of co-payments for 
visiting a family practitioner, contrary to widespread theoretical presumptions,371 do 
not differ noticeably between different income groups.372 That might at first glance ap-
pear to provide confirmation for objective “rational” steering, but it certainly calls into 
question some of the conventional modelling ideas about purchasing power, marginal 
utility and prioritisation. 
Fundamentally too little attention is given to the question whether moral hazard 
effects or “hidden actions” of people with health insurance cannot in fact also have de-
sired effects,373 namely where there is underuse of services offered;374 this is an issue 
in certain areas of the German health care system.375 The proposed solutions for the 
                                                  
367  Pauly 1968, 1983; Breyer et al. 2005; Pütz 2003: 28, Felder/Werblow 2006: 17f and many 
others. 
368  Ginsburg 2006: w528f; Yegian 2006: w534. 
369  Reiners 2006: 10ff. 
370  Reiners/Schnee 2007; presentation of Bernard Braun, University of Bremen, during a hear-
ing of the Federal parliamentary group of the “Left Party” (Linkspartei) in the German House 
of Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) on user charges for outpatient physician visits held on 
May 15, 2006 in Berlin. 
371  See e.g. Stuart/Stockton 1973: 353, footnote 2. 
372  Cherkin et al. 1992: 38f. 
373  Cf. Rice 2004: 134ff. 
374  For example McGlynn et al. 2003. 
375  SVR 2003a: 52, 218. 
  63 
dilemma that subjectively rational consumer behaviour unfortunately does not always 
match up with the cost efficiency that is increasingly being demanded are hardly satis-
factory. An analysis in British accident and emergency departments showed that 
physiotherapy initiated immediately for soft tissue injuries, which was associated with 
perceptible out-of-pocket payments, led to greater patient satisfaction but not to a 
quicker restoration of ability to work and thus caused no broader macroeconomic bene-
fit.376 This problem might tend to increase as drug advertising to laypeople expands, for 
if pharmaceutical advertisers succeed in convincing “consumers” of the unproven ad-
vantages of new products;377 demonstrating cost-effectiveness will definitely require an 
imaginative use of models and data.378 
Altogether it is fascinating how unshakeably the moral hazard theory has come to 
dominate – for four decades – not only health economics but also the social policy and 
development debates. No amount of pointing to “impressive economic studies”379 can 
disguise the fact that the empirical evidence - apart from interviews with selected 
economists - is largely restricted to a superficial interpretation of the findings of the 
RAND study (described in detail in chapter 8). The moral hazard assumptions are based 
exclusively on a subjective perception of overuse of health care services and observed 
changes in use of medical services under different cost-sharing conditions.380 The de-
rived data for “price elasticity” and especially the classification as “frivolous” or even 
“wasteful” consumption381 completely ignore any clinical-epidemiological, socio-
economic or other influence on the demand behaviour of patients. 
If direct payments by patients reduce the use of both useful evidence-based treat-
ment and medically non-indicated measures (see chapter 9), then there is no basis to 
conclude from cost-dependent changes in utilisation that there has been “unjustified” 
or “frivolous” exploitation of the situation of being insured. For avoiding the use of 
medical services does not correlate at all with their clinical-epidemiological justifica-
tion and purposefulness. The decisive research question would instead be whether the 
demand for a health service by an insured person is to be regarded as justified use or an 
expression of moral hazard. That question, however, has to date not only remained un-
answered; the proponents of “moral risk” have so far successfully avoided asking it.382 
In the worldwide renaissance of neo-positivism, where the neo-classical ideology has 
                                                  
376  Richardson et al. 2005: 91f. 
377  Kravitz et al. 2005: 1998f. 
378  A good example of this is Block 2007. 
379  In Schulenburg (2007: 14), the following statement on cost-sharing arrangements can be 
found: “Empirical studies support impressively that co-payments induce a sustained reduc-
tion of the demand for health care benefits and are an effective means for preventing the so 
called supply-induced demand of health care delivery.” 
380  Manning and Marquis (1996: 610) define moral hazard as follows: “Cost sharing decreases 
the out-of-pocket price paid by the patient, which increases the amount of medical care 
demanded (moral hazard).” This approach fully ignores the possibility that in view of a po-
tential under-utilisation this effect might rather express medical needs than frivolous use. 
By the way, the same is also true for the assumption of ex-ante moral hazard, which does 
not play an important role in the matter of patient out-of-pocket payment in any case, and 
the empirical evidence for which still remains to be furnished. 
381  Moise/Jacobzone 2003: 20. 
382  Cf. Wagstaff/Pradhan 2005: 1. 
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succeeded in placing politicians and social policy-makers under a permanent obligation 
to provide evidence for the obvious, it is rather surprising to find that there is a com-
plete lack of clinical, epidemiological, psychological, sociological or even economic indi-
cators for the objective measurement of moral hazard. 
15.2 Provider-driven Demand 
Patient cost-sharing ignores the real power relations in the healthcare system. The ex-
pensive decisions are made not by the patient but by the physician.383 It has been ade-
quately demonstrated that the design of the payment arrangements largely determines 
the services provided by providers.384 As a rule physicians and hospitals respond to re-
duced revenues – be it through loss of “points” per service or through reduced or abol-
ished patient co-payments – by inducing demand for their services385 or through other 
modifications of their behaviour as providers,386 in order to avert income losses.387 The 
volume of services provided is thus primarily the outcome of payment and budgeting 
systems and not of the demand behaviour of the insured persons.388 In this context 
managing physicians’ decisions would appear to be more promising for controlling 
health expenditure than additionally burdening patients with charges and cost-sharing. 
Patient co-payments exacerbate the problem of increasing supply-induced demand 
and reduce the efficiency of the system as a whole.389 Thus the restriction of drug cov-
erage for older Medicaid members in the US state of New Hampshire to a maximum of 
two products led not only to a 35 percent drop in medicine-taking, but also to a signifi-
cant increase in admissions to nursing homes.390 After the abolition of this restriction 
the effect – whose costs clearly exceeded the potential savings – turned out to be com-
pletely reversible.391 Also revealing are findings from Canada, where a study examining 
the behaviour of older rheumatism patients under different drug co-payment condi-
tions between 1997 and 2000 found that although cost-sharing led to a drop in pre-
scription collections, in times of high drug co-payments the number of visits to physi-
cians rose significantly and the number of hospital admissions also tended to rise.392 
This result confirms the observation that hospital treatment and above all practitioner’s 
visits can be avoidance responses to new or increasing prescription charges, which 
                                                  
383  Steinbach et al. 2004: 2f; Deber et al. 2001: 1417ff. 
384  Cf. Pfaff 1985: 273f; Zuckerman et al. 2004: 379ff. 
385  Rice/Labelle 1989: 597; Creese/Kutzin 1995: 10. 
386  Beck/Horne 1980: 794f; Schroeder/Cantor 1991: 1099; Richardson 1991: 16. 
387  The implementation of cost sharing in the United Mine Workers Health and Retirement Fund 
in Pennsylvania did indeed reduce expenditure on health care for miners by 10 percent, but 
overall average costs per illness period increased for all patients in the catchment area by 
17 percent. Similarly, outpatient physician consultations by miners decreased by 4 percent, 
whereas doctor visits for the rest of the population increased by 11 percent (Fahs 1992: 35, 
41f). 
388  Bodenheimer 2005a: 851. 
389  Cf. Arhin-Tenkorang 2000: 13f. 
390  Soumerai/Ross-Degnan 1991: 1975. 
391  Soumerai et al. 1991: 1075, 1076. 
392  Anis et al. 2005: 1337ff. 
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greatly undermine the intended saving effect.393 Studies of the effect of co-payments 
must always also take into consideration provider behaviour if they claim to be provid-
ing empirical evidence. Thus the effects of the practice fee in Germany may at least to 
some extent be due to alterations to the payment system for physicians and the intro-
duction of practice budgets, which occurred at almost the same time.394 
15.3 Cost Containment Lacking 
Health policy and especially health economics almost always very considerably overes-
timate the potential of cost-sharing as an instrument for cost-containment.395 It gener-
ally has an effect only at first contact with the healthcare system and on simpler, 
cheaper services. The really cost-intensive measures, such as hospital treatment, opera-
tions, cancer drugs, chemotherapy and radiotherapy depend almost exclusively on the 
diagnoses and decisions made by medical professionals.396 On the other hand, the risks 
of partial underprovision are not negligible,397 and often the costs ensuing from delayed 
intervention may exceed the savings.398 In view of this record the continued faith in 
patient cost-sharing would seem more pseudo-religious than evidence-based.399 
Almost nobody seriously calls for a proportionate burden to be placed on the high-
intensity users of the health service. As a consequence of advances in medical technol-
ogy an increasing concentration of health spending on ever smaller sectors of the popu-
lation has been observed since the middle of the twentieth century. Thus US studies at 
the end of the 1980s show that half of the US population accounts for no more than 4 
percent of health spending, while more than 50 percent is spent on one twentieth of the 
population and nearly 30 percent on just the 1 percent of high-intensity users.400 In 
1987 the “healthy” half of the population consumed just 3 percent of health spending in 
the United States, while 41 percent went on the 2 percent who had to make most use of 
the system.401 Recent studies from the United States actually show that just 7 percent of 
spending is on 70 percent of the population, while more than 50 percent of spending is 
accounted for by the “sickest” 5 percent. The unequal distribution of health spending in 
the United States has stabilised at a high level during the past two to three decades.402 
Similar distributions have also long been known for France, where in 1970 two 
fifths of health spending was concentrated on 2 percent of citizens and the healthier 
half of the population was responsible for no more than 1 percent of the costs.403 In 
Germany the spending curve is similarly skewed. Whereas half the members of the 
                                                  
393  Anis et al. 2005: 1339. Cf. also Tamblyn et al. 2003. 
394  Pfaff 1985: 273f; Reiners/Schnee 2007. 
395  Manning et al. 1987: 269; Saltman/Figueras 1996: 17; Zuvekas/Cohen 2007: 256. 
396  Stoddart et al. 1993: 7; Deber 2000: 37; Neuman/Rice 2003: 5. 
397  See Chapters 10-13. 
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statutory insurance funds cause just 1 percent of spending on treatment, four fifths of 
spending is accounted for by one tenth of the insured population, nearly 50 percent by 
one fortieth and no less than 20 percent by 0.5 percent of the insured population.404 
This skewed distribution of the financial burden of treatment across the population 
is found in all industrialised countries and is of fundamental importance for the cost-
sharing discussion.405 Purely mathematically, the potential for reducing society’s health 
expenditure is very small, as long as co-payments are applied largely to low-intensity 
users.406 The claimed funding and steering effects of cost-sharing would – at least theo-
retically – be expected to be much stronger if they affected those “users” who cause the 
highest costs. However in most societies cost-sharing for high- and maximum-intensity 
users of the health service is not only ethically extremely problematic, but there is also 
currently insufficient evidence that it would lead to reduced spending for this group of 
patients.407 Besides, they compete with other cost-containment approaches, in particu-
lar the disease management programmes which have now also found their way into the 
German statutory health insurance system and aim to provide better and more efficient 
– and thus more cost-effective – healthcare especially for high-intensity users. 
Alongside the inevitable effects of demographic, epidemiological and particularly 
technological developments,408 in international comparison mainly the following fac-
tors turn out to be cost-driving: a high general level of prices and high charges for 
medical services,409 high administrative costs,410 efficiency losses through excess capac-
ity and underuse,411 and the intensity of utilisation of medical facilities.412 The authors 
of the RAND study already came to the conclusion that spending on health care could 
only be influenced to a relatively small extent (approximately 10 percent) by the struc-
ture of the funding and insurance system.413  
In the rich industrialised states there is a certain correlation of out-of-pocket pay-
ments and high health expenditure.414 One explanation could be that legislators respond 
to high levels of spending with cost-sharing. But it is just as plausible that privatisation 
of costs leads to a loss of political control. The stronger the free-market element in so-
cial protection and the more healthcare is located outside public or at least regulated 
insurance arrangements, the greater the wiggle room for service providers to increase 
                                                  
404  GEK 2003. In the USA average health expenditures for the “healthy” half of the population 
were US$122  per year, whereas the most expensive cases amounted on average to $56,459 
per person (Berk/Monheit 2001: 13). A statutory health insurance provider in Germany cal-
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their profits at the expense of the patients, whose negotiating position is weak. Charges 
due from users of healthcare facilities serve to make up for budget-limited or otherwise 
capped revenues. Shifting costs to patients takes the pressure off funders, increases the 
revenues of medical service-providers, and also bypasses the political conflicts with 
service-providers that are otherwise inevitably provoked by reform measures. Costs 
increasingly shift to the weakest players in health policy, the patients, to the benefit of 
the providers.415 
15.4 Discriminating against the Old and the Poor 
A relevant revenue increase through out-of-pocket payment for health care can only be 
achieved through high and subjectively tangible cost-sharing.416 But the greater the 
burden on the individual when medical facilities are used, the stronger the unavoidable 
consequences of social disadvantages for poorer sections of the population and ill citi-
zens.417 Cost-sharing acts as an access barrier to health services especially for members 
of lower-income groups because their purchasing power is smaller.418 But because at 
the same time the need for healthcare is higher and doctor-patient contacts are more 
frequent in this share of the population,419 payments are due more frequently and de-
ductibles more quickly become a cost trap. The outcome is a partial inversion of the 
idea that the healthy should help bear the financial burden of sickness420 and contra-
dicts one of the basic tenets of social protection against health risks.421 The increasing 
social gap in take-up of dental services, which has been observed in the past two dec-
ades in the United States,422 is certainly partly due to the widespread and – especially in 
Medicaid – continually rising cost-sharing for dental treatment.423 A similar trend, inci-
dentally, has also been found in Denmark – a northern European country with compa-
rably small social inequalities.424 
With older people this effect is especially striking, because here old-age poverty and 
chronic complaints come together.425 On one hand, patient cost-sharing reduces the 
capability of social protection systems to even out social inequalities of health opportu-
nities. Against this background, many countries have set up protective arrangements 
for vulnerable groups. However, these can never exclude or counterbalance all social 
hardships, their effectiveness turns out to be quite uneven and they are always associ-
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ated with sometimes considerable organisational expense. On the other hand, they do 
have an inhibiting effect on the two desired effects of cost-sharing because they reduce 
the direct revenues the providers (unless they are compensated for the revenue fore-
gone) and at least for the exempted groups they lessen the postulated management ef-
fect.426 
15.5 Transaction Costs 
The set-up, collection, accounting and control of patient cost-sharing is associated with 
not inconsiderable administrative costs, which are, however, regularly omitted from the 
model calculations and ignored in evaluations. The collection of co-payments – and es-
pecially the implementation of exemption arrangements – may in fact often impact on 
the level of insurance contributions and thus consume part of the postulated gain from 
increased revenue and reduced spending.427 It must also be kept in mind that every ad-
ministrative regulation has its weaknesses. In practice a varying proportion of those 
entitled to support will be excluded. Good examples of this are found in unclaimed so-
cial welfare benefits in Germany428 and the unreliable allocation of fund insurance sub-
sidies (“premium discount”) for low-income groups in Switzerland.429 
In the Netherlands various governments have repeatedly made attempts since the 
early 1980s to establish co-payments in acute medical care. In most cases they turned 
out to be unsuccessful and were abandoned shortly after their introduction.430 Both the 
introduction of small flat-rate drug co-payments of approximately one euro per pre-
scription and low co-insurance arrangements for medicines in the 1990s were designed 
to avoid any negative repercussions, but the revenues collected turned out to be insuffi-
cient to cover the administrative costs involved.431 In 1997 the Netherlands introduced 
a 20 percent practice fee per physician visit, but neither the hoped-for funding returns 
not the expected management effect materialised, so this form of co-payment also came 
to an end after just three years.432 Overall it can be observed that calling co-payments 
“minor” can perhaps be justified for short treatment episodes, but with long- or ever-
lasting therapies even small cost-sharing amounts add up to a noticeable financial bur-
den for those affected.433 
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15.6 Disregarding Medical Needs 
The approach taken by many economists and politicians, to regulate health spending via 
demand behaviour of patients, ignores the relevance of clinical diagnoses in a very fun-
damental way. Co-payments that are intended to keep supposedly trivial cases out of 
the healthcare system lead to incompetent self-diagnoses434 and to self-medication.435 
According to the extent that diagnosis shifts to the layperson, this can moreover lead to 
overprovision, undersupply and inadequate provision of care.436 It is now sufficiently 
established and has been widely proven that the various forms of patient cost-sharing 
prevent both superfluous and medically indicated interventions.437 To date cost-sharing 
has never been used successfully in any field of (para-)medical care to reliably and con-
fidently distinguish between “reasonable” and “superfluous” utilisation of health care 
and to restrict the desired effects to “frivolous” use.438 The intended - and often also 
achieved - reduction of use through co-payments always has just as strong an impact 
on indicated and highly efficient measures as on inappropriate or ones whose effect is 
marginal.439 
To achieve a reduction in demand for supposedly unjustified treatments via user 
fees would presuppose that users of the health care system have a degree of medical 
knowledge that actually only medical professionals can have.440 It is plain that such 
prior knowledge does not exist in the population, otherwise the services provided by 
medical experts would be superfluous. Research into the understanding and general 
knowledge of the population about relevant illnesses indeed shows – despite broad me-
dia treatment of the issues – a very sobering lack of knowledge among citizens.441 For 
making a “rational” decision patients would firstly have to estimate in advance the level 
of the out-of-pocket payment involved and secondly be able to weigh up the conse-
quences of treatment and non-treatment.442 Because this is normally not the case, cost-
sharing is simply unable to fulfil the assumption that a patient will manage to distin-
guish with adequate reliability between “rational” and “frivolous” use of health services. 
Ultimately out-of-pocket payments lead, whether symptoms are slight or severe, to a 
significant cutback in healthcare utilisation.443 
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Furthermore, the often observed treatment delays caused by cost-sharing lead to a 
worsening of conditions and increase the cost of medical intervention.444 Delayed or 
avoided treatment by no means automatically generates the desired savings, but may in 
fact result in considerably higher ensuing costs.445 Recently published research con-
firms the long-held suspicion446 that delayed treatment in medical facilities for benefi-
ciaries of the Veteran Affairs insurance scheme increases mortality. If a patient has to 
wait longer than a month to be seen their mortality in the following half year is signifi-
cantly higher than for those who are treated more quickly.447 Cost-sharing arrange-
ments that adequately take into consideration the medical or clinical needs at the indi-
vidual level do not as yet exist. 
 
15.7 Underestimated External Effects 
As the general – and worldwide – rise in health expenditure is induced considerably 
more strongly by suppliers than by consumers,448 it is, as already demonstrated, no sur-
prise that the demand-side instrument of involving patients directly in health care 
costs makes little contribution to reducing spending and containing costs.449 Instead 
cost-sharing – especially among the chronically sick – reduces take-up of healthcare 
services in an undesired manner that endangers the quality of clinical care while at the 
same time increasing follow-on costs.450 Applying the cost-sharing ideology to the 
chronically ill brings to light an inherent contradiction in the funding and steering 
function of co-payments. In the population where the highest spending occurs and thus 
potentially the greatest savings or revenues could be achieved, “cost-sharing” contra-
dicts the approach of using co-payments to prevent “unnecessary” use of healthcare 
services. In fact, making these patients contribute to the costs of their treatment brings 
about absolutely unwanted counterproductive effects. 
Not every avoided office visit is necessarily a gain, and in fact not every prescrip-
tion less will necessarily reduce costs for the insurer. The primarily economic – and 
above all micro-economic – perspective on health financing in general and specifically 
patient cost-sharing has led in Germany and elsewhere to a popularisation of the sim-
plistic misconception that every saved health treatment is automatically reflected in 
cuts in expenditure. If the use of healthcare services affected by co-payments falls this 
is generally regarded as proof of the effectiveness of cost-sharing. But this assumption 
ignores both the clinical and epidemiological aspects and the external effects.451 The 
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urgently needed distinction between desired and undesired effects – which would be 
imperative for converting treatment reductions into cost savings – is lacking both in 
most of the published studies and in the political debate. 
Overall, the expected influence of cost-sharing on general cost trends is at best 
negligible - whether through reducing the required amount of reimbursement for 
health care benefits delivered or through reductions in the total number of treat-
ments.452 Often the undesired effects cause considerably higher costs than the sum of 
revenues and savings and completely counteract the cost-containing effects widely ex-
pected of co-payments. Finally, the undesired effects go far beyond the level of the in-
surance funds and affect the individual’s social and economic participation. Cost-related 
therapy terminations caused by cost-sharing lead not only to a worse health status of 
people with chronic illnesses and to an increase in fundamentally avoidable complica-
tions and to a greater need for treatments,453 but also to increased incapacity to work 
and to productivity losses.454 In this way out-of-pocket payments for health care ulti-
mately endanger the quality and reliability of the social health protection system, 
which all industrialised nations at least aim to realise. 
15.8 Erosion of Solidarity 
Out-of-pocket payments reduce the social compensatory effect of health insurance 
funds and state-run health systems. They undermine the functioning of solidarity-
based insurance schemes, which are based on predictable regular prepayment for cov-
ering unpredictable costs of sickness and have proven to be superior to all other fund-
ing models.455 This is also supported by the observation that in poorer countries, espe-
cially, user charges counteract the income-maintaining effects of (social) health insur-
ance456 while in richer societies they can be contradictory to the established mecha-
nisms of the principle of solidarity, partly undermine their effects, and reinforce social 
injustice and inequality.457 Directly involving patients in their treatment costs may re-
duce the financial access barriers to health insurance but it always has a negative effect 
on the quality of the insurance protection458 and on access to high-quality medical 
care.459 This is especially easy to comprehend where the patient’s own share amounts to 
a high proportion of treatment costs, as is the case in many insurance contracts in the 
United States and across the board for example in South Korea,460 or where co-
payments are particularly substantial; among the industrialised countries this is most 
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important in Japan, where hospital treatment can easily cost the patient many thou-
sands of euros.461 
The theory of many economists that cost-sharing makes health systems fairer by 
eliminating waste and thus stabilising the acceptance of solidarity-based health insur-
ance systems seems increasingly to be disproved. Instead, in a situation of ever new 
cost-sharing arrangements participants are losing their confidence in fair social redis-
tribution.462 Despite all the rhetoric, cost-sharing and co-payments do nothing to 
achieve financial sustainability of health care systems.463 Instead they improve the po-
sition of the healthy and better-off to the detriment of the ill and the poor.464 Prescrib-
ing the bitter pill of co-payments is only justified when all other health policy options 
have been considered and exhausted.465 The small and at best hypothetical benefit of 
increasing cost-sharing in the health sector justifies neither the risks of losing accep-
tance of the social protection system nor the danger of medium- and long-term cost 
increases.466 
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